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Introduction
INTRODUCTION
" If greatness may be measured by scope of influence, then
Sigmund Freud is without doubt the greatest of psychologists.
"
- Thomas Leahey> 1987.
The name of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and the ideas originating
with that name, have had a significant influence on nearly every inquiry into
human nature conducted over the twentieth century. His theories are applied,
reviewed, debated and regularly referred to in literature, medicine,
philosophy, sociology, theology and of course academic and popular
psychology.
This Viennese neurologist, turned founder of psychoanalysis,
revolutionized the way many people had previously thought about human
behavior and mental life. Freud single handedly opened up a whole new
world with his analysis of human sexuality and it's critical import in human
development. He developed a systematic account of the function and
meaning of dreams. He uncovered "meaning" in the seemingly meaningless
contents of jokes, memory lapses and 'slips of the tongue' such that
'Freudian slip' is now a household word. He uncovered the mechanisms of
human defense against intolerable mental and emotional pain, in particular,
the cornerstone of repression. He contributed to the demythologizing of
religion by concluding that religious belief was an exceptionally vigorous
universal illusion.
Yet all of these remarkable achievements shadow in comparison to
Freud's greatest legacy - the systematic development of a theory of a
dynamic unconscious, for it is on the bases of this theory that all his others
are made possible. Whilst the notion of an unconscious side to the mind was
not new, Freud alone postulated specific mechanisms and dynamics that
offered a full explanation of unconsciously motivated behavior (UMB). That
he did so against the tide of the emerging discipline of mental psychology is
testament to his tenacity. Freud was convinced that understanding the
mechanisms of the dynamic unconscious was indeed the most important
discovery for the psychology of the mind.
Academic psychology at the turn of the nineteenth century was
chiefly influenced by Whilem Wundt, the man widely credited with founding
scientific psychology. For Wundt and his early colleagues, psychology was
the controlled scientific study of immediate experience and as a result they
were only concerned with investigating the mind which consisted of human
consciousness. In this context 'mind' was understood to be the totality of
conscious experience at a given moment, not as a mental entity or
substance. Wundt and his students then applied a method of introspection
which required the 'objective' description of conscious content ( including
'subjective' elements, such as feelings) dependent on the state of the
introspector at a given time and place. Given this emphasis it is hardly
surprising that Freud faced more than mild disinterest in his theory of
unconscious ideas form the psychological status quo of his day. He would
later recall this in the 1914 paper On the History of the Psycho-Analytic
l\/lovement,
... for ten years I was the only person who concerned himself with it,
and all the dissatisfaction that the new phenomenon aroused in my
contemporaries has been poured out in the form of criticism on my
head. (1914, S.E. XIV; 7).
Wundt, for example, concluded that as it was impossible to
introspect the unconscious it should be dismissed as a metaphysical myth
(Leahey, 1987). Freud, however, was never deterred by such criticism. He
rallied countless hours of clinical data obtained from case histories as
scientific support for his theory and over the ensuing decades the tide of
popular opinion changed. Today the notion of 'unconscious motivation' is
widely credited.
This thesis will be particularly interested in the fact that theology
has come to see much in Freud that is of value in understanding complex
human behavior. The remarkable development and expansion in the field of
'Christian Psychology' and in particular Christian psychotherapy give
evidence to this. Although the majority of Christian psychotherapists may
not class themselves as 'Freudian therapists', or even as psychoanalytic in
their theoretical position, many have nevertheless assimilated the
possibility of Freud's core discovery - unconsciously motivated behaviors
(UMB's). This thesis will re-examine the relationship between UMB's and
theology at the most fundamental level - that of the conceptual and
theoretical. The aim is to assess whether the basic tenets of Freud's theory of
a dynamic unconscious and the basic tenets of a Biblical view of the human
are indeed conceptually compatible. However, before this objective can be
realized it will be essential to achieve two preliminary goals.
Firstly, it will be necessary to present carefully Freud's own account
of his theory and it's development. The best guarantee for understanding an
idea is to understand the history of that idea. The rationale that accompanies
an idea's development and refinement will alone allow one truly to
understand the final theory with all of it's ramifications. This is often
overlooked by scholars who criticize elements of Freudian theory. Perhaps
this is understandable when one acknowledges that Freud's writings were
posthumous and not entirely systematic. Furthermore, Freud developed his
system of psychoanalysis over a period of nearly half a century (1893-1939).
His concepts and terms were not static, delivered from the outset in their
final form, but rather they developed progressively over this period, thus
leaving some degree of definitional confusion. However, it is my contention
that these difficulties are easily resolved if one takes the time to analyze
Freud's concepts in their historical context. Therefore, an adequate
understanding of UMB's will require at least a brief survey of the
developments of Freud's notions of the 'dynamic unconscious' and
'repression' as given in his writings.
To this end, Part I of this thesis will trace the development of Freud's
theorizing about the dynamic unconscious. The survey will be detailed
although not exhaustive. The goals are to ensure that we accurately uncover
Freud's theorizing regarding an unconscious mind which can motivate
behavior; to define clearly the nature of such a mind; and to explore it's
relationship to consciousness. A full answer to such an inquiry cannot be
found in one time and place of Freud's writings ( although as we shall latter
see this is a point to which most of his critics seem oblivious!). A survey of
the main papers form several periods will be required. This will enable the
achievement of two further goals: Firstly, to trace the development of Freud's
conceptualizations over time, and Secondly, to deal only with the material
pertinent to the issues of this thesis. It should be noted that considerable
time will be spent expounding the antecedents of psychoanalysis and the
development of Freud's thought in the early years. This period is of particular
importance as it reveals Freud's perceived need for psychoanalysis and
establishes the basic tenets of UMB's which latter theorizing mainly refines
and systematizes.
In Part II it will be helpful to see how others have assessed Freud's
notions before we submit them to analysis. A great deal has been said about
the notion of UMB's from both the empiricist and the philosopher. A basic
understanding of their assessments of the issues will be a helpful base from
which to launch theological discussion.
I choose to deal with Freud and Freud alone because the systematic
development of the mechanism of a dynamic unconscious is truly his.
Subsequent revisions and developments have added little to the master's
hand. Indeed, I think Freud would defend his right to be dealt with alone in
this context. In the paper A History of tfie Psyctio-Analytic Movement he
stated,
I consider myself justified in maintaining that even today no one can
know better than I do what psychoanalysis is, how it differs from other
ways of investigating the life of the mind and what would better be
described by some other name. (1914, S.E. XIV; 7).
I assert that despite the plethora of theorizing since, this situation has not
changed significantly.
Finally, it will be helpful at the outset to point out that what is being
examined here is not the hypothesis of the unconscious. It is obvious that
most of what we 'know' is not in consciousness at a given moment (like your
phone number before I mentioned it) and these ideas may well reside in a
mental place - the 'unconscious' for want of a better name (It should also be
realized that there are alternatives to such an explanation, for example, there
is a view that 'ideas' not in conscious awareness simply dissipate into the
neural network, ceasing to be entities until the need arises to re-form them).
What is being examined in this thesis is the notion of a dynamic
unconscious, that is, the hypothesis of the existence of unconscious ideas
that can affect our behavior while we have no awareness of them. This reified
unconscious then becomes the instigator of dreams, fantasies, neuroses,
behavioral errors, obsessions, and slips of the tongue and memory. In fact,
unconscious ideas become the motivating force behind much of one's
behavior.
That such a notion has become so widely accepted and propagated
in one form or another among evangelical Christian thinkers is somewhat
surprising, for as we shall see it produces considerable theological
problems. Not the least of these is how a morally good God could hold
anyone accountable for amoral behavior (either overt or mental) when it's
origination and motivation is not under conscious control. To issues such as
these we will return after the stage has been sufficiently set.
Chapter One
CHAPTER ONE:
THE ANTECEDENTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
The origins of Freud's formulation of the dynamic unconscious and
the mechanism of repression are not systematically expounded in his early
writings (1893-96). However, if the retrospective accounts of the
development of psychoanalysis, such as The History of the Psycho-Analytic
hJlovement (1914) and An Autobiographical Study (1925) are superimposed
over his earliest theoretical and clinical accounts, one can explicate the
formulation of the basic elements of these theories.
Freud's initial training was in medicine. After several digressions he
passed his final medical examinations on March 30, 1881, although as his
friend and biographer Ernest Jones records, it was not an event of great
importance to the young Freud, rather, "It was a thing that had to be done in
the course of events, ..." (Jones, 1961:38). Freud's real interest was in
physiological laboratory research; he had no desire whatever to practice
medicine and as a result continued to work on research projects at the
Brucke Physiological Institute for some fifteen months after graduation until
July 1882. It seems by this time Freud, with some input from Brucke, had
realized that there was no financial security to be gained in research alone
and as by this time he had met his fiancee he made the purely pragmatic
decision to enter practice.
The turning point came in 1882, when my teacher, for whom I felt the
highest possible esteem, corrected my father's generous
improvidence by strongly advising me, in view of my bad financial
position, to abandon my theoretical career. I followed his advice, left
the physiological laboratory and entered the General Hospital as an
Aspirant [Clinical Assistant]. (1925, S.E. XX; 10).
On July 31, 1882, Freud entered the surgery department of the
General Hospital of Vienna but soon transferred to the Division of Internal
Medicine under Nothnagel. During this time, try as he might, Freud could not
generate much enthusiasm for medical practice. As Jones recalls "He found
no more interest in treating the sick patients in the wards than in studying
their diseases. By now he must have been convinced more than ever that he
was not born to be a doctor." (1961:43). Six and a half months later on May 1,
1883, Freud took the all important step of transferring to the Psychiatric
Clinic. He was immediately appointed as an assistant to the well respected
Theodor Meynert (1833-1892). It should be realized that at this time
psychiatry and neurology were closely related, in fact, Meynert's fame was
almost exclusively as a brain anatomist. In January 1884, Freud advanced to
the department that would lead him to the specialty of his life's work;
Nervous Diseases. Although he did work in other departments in the years to
come, it was the fields of neurology and nervous diseases that captivated
Freud. He remained at the General Hospital until 1885 when with help from
Brucke, he obtained a travel award to study with Charcot the great
neurologist in Paris. This would prove to be a most significant period in
Freud's life as relates to the development of his own theoretical notions.
The trip to Paris (October 1885- February 1886) was undoubtedly
motivated by anatomical research and not clinical interest on Freud's part.
But Charcot was to change this by unintentionally turning Freud's interests
from neuropathology to psychopathology, a change that was to revolutionize
his outlook on human nervous disorders. In a letter to his fiancee (Martha
Bernays) written a month after his arrival (November 24, 1885), Freud states,
"Charcot, who is one of the greatest of Physicians and a man whose common
sense is touched by simple genius, is simply uprooting my aims and
opinions." Charcot's influence on Freud can be further gleaned in the 1893
obituary Freud wrote on account of his death which occurred on August 16th.
It revealed that Charcot's concentration on hysteria had profoundly affected
Freud. Charcot brought the notion of hysteria to a place of scientific
credibility rather than a case of female malingering. But perhaps most
importantly was the clinical relationship between hypnotism and hysterical
phenomena which he discovered though did not pursue at a theoretical level.
Freud would later recall.
What impressed me most of all while I was with Charcot were his
latest investigations upon hysteria, some of which were carried out
under my own eyes. He had proved, for instance, the genuineness of
hysterical phenomena and their conformity to laws, the frequent
occurrence of hysteria in men, the production of hysterical paralyses
and contractures by hypnotic suggestion and the fact that such
artificial products showed, down to their smallest details, the same
features as spontaneous attacks, which were often brought on
traumatically. (1925, S.E. Vol. XX; 13).
It was this work on hysterical paralyses which became manifest after some
traumatic event, that would prove to be of particular significance.
In the obituary, Freud recalled how Charcot attempted to reproduce
the symptoms of such cases of non-organic paralysis by hypnotizing his
patients. In successfully doing so Freud concluded that Charcot,
succeeded in proving by an unbroken chain of argument, that these
paralyses were the result of ideas which had dominated the patients
brain at moments of a special disposition. In this way, the
mechanism of hysterical phenomenon was explained for the first
time." (1893, S.E. Vol. ill; 22).
The fact that so respected a neurologist had used hypnotic
suggestion was an important factor in Freud's willingness to assign it
immediate credibility. After all, Charcot had shown that by use of hypnotic
suggestion alone hysterical symptoms such as paralysis could be elicited in
certain subjects. While the impact of such a discovery was for most
scientists purely pragmatic, suggesting some as yet undiscovered
neurological mechanism, for Freud it marked the realization that such
symptoms could be initiated or abolished and therefore treated by ideas
alone. Thus, his time in Paris led Freud to change his whole view of the origin
of hysterical symptoms. This change is summed up by Jones when he notes
that Freud now realized "they had a psychogenic origin. This opened the
door to a medical motive for investigating the psychology of patients, with all
the ramifying results that the past half century has shown." (1961:149).
Of course Freud's full realization of the significance of what he had
witnessed was not immediate. He returned to Vienna in 1886 and began
practicing as a specialist in nervous diseases. He recalls that during this
time "My therapeutic arsenal contained only two weapons, electrotherapy
and hypnotism,..." (1925, S.E. Vol. XX; 16). Electrotherapy, which he reports to
have learnt from Erb's 1882 textbook on the matter was soon abandoned by
Freud as 'no help whatever'. What he had thought to be
"
an epitome of exact
observations was merely the construction of phantasy." (1925, S.E. Vol. XX;
16). This now left hypnosis as the only method available to Freud for treating
the neuroses. He spent the next two years, starting in 1887, developing the
use of the technique of hypnotic suggestion which he had recently learnt
from Charcot in Paris. Despite the association with Charcot, hypnosis still
faced some stiff opposition back in Vienna. Meynert, a one time ally of
Freud's but rival of Charcot's, openly dismissed it as 'hocus-pocus' stating
that "it degrades a human being to a creature without will or reason and only
hastens his nervous and mental degeneration." (Meynert, 1889).
Whilst hypnosis had some remarkable results, Freud himself had
some misgivings about it almost straight away. Firstly, some patients simply
could not be hypnotized, and secondly, many others could not be hypnotized
sufficiently deeply to allow the hypnotic suggestions to work. In 1889, Freud
began to re-examine the technique under the influence of Libeault and then
Bernheim. It was from observing Bernheim's experiments that he received
"the profoundest impression of the possibility that there could be powerful
mental processes which nevertheless remained hidden from the
consciousness of men." (1925, S.E. Vol. XX; 17, italic added). Freud now
stood at the border of his new world of unconscious ideas, but one more
important development was yet to take place.
Unhappy with hypnosis, Freud began to develop a method whereby
the patient was questioned while in a hypnotic state for the purpose of
tracing back the symptom in question. This technique had first been shown to
be very useful by his close friend Joseph Breuer who had demonstrated it to
Freud prior to his trip to Paris. At that time Freud was enthusiastic about the
technique which Breuer named the 'cathartic method' but Charcot seems to
have dampened his interest in it. As he recalls, "I determined to inform
Charcot of these discoveries when I reached Paris, and I actually did so. But
the great man showed no interest in my first outline of the subject, so that I
never returned to it and allowed it to pass from my mind." (1925, S.E. Vol. XX;
19,20). On return to Vienna, however, Freud once again teamed up with
Breuer and the pair started to apply the new approach with patients. It is
worth recalling Freud's memories of this period and the initial success it
brought.
When I was back in Vienna I turned once more to Breuer's obsen/ation
and made him tell me more about it. The patient had been a young
girl of unusual education and gifts, who had fallen ill while she was
nursing her father, of whom she was devotedly fond. When Breuer
took over her case it presented a variegated picture of paralyses with
contractures, inhibitions and states of mental confusion. A chance
observation showed her physician [Breuer] that she could be relieved
of these clouded states of consciousness if she was induced to
express in words the affective phantasy by which she was at the
moment dominated. From this discovery, Breuer arrived at a new
method of treatment. He put her into deep hypnosis and made her tell
him each time what it was that was oppressing her mind. After the
attacks of depressive confusion had been overcome in this way, he
employed the same procedure for removing her inhibitions and
physical disorders. In her waking state the girl could no more
describe than other patients how her symptoms had arisen, and she
could discover no link between them and any experiences of her life.
In hypnosis she immediately discovered the missing connection....
When the patient recalled a situation of this kind in a hallucinatory
way under hypnosis and carried through to its conclusion, with a free
expression of emotion, the mental act which she had originally
suppressed, the symptom was abolished and did not return. (1925,
S.E. Vol. XX; 20).
In 1889, Freud applied the technique himself in the case of Frau
Emmy v. N. and persisted with it for a while, but even this technique soon
showed drawbacks. "The first was that even the most brilliant results were
liable to be suddenly wiped away if my personal relation with the patient
became disturbed." (1925, S.E. Vol. XX; 27). The second was that " the
personal emotional relation between the doctor and the patient was after all
stronger than the whole cathartic process,.." (1925, S.E. XX; 17).
Whilst it now seemed clear to Freud that hypnosis would have to be
abandoned, he did not want to lose the very beneficial catharsis that could
accompany it. Over the period of 1892-1898, Freud progressively replaced
both hypnotic suggestion and Breuer's cathartic method as the core of his
therapeutic arsenal and moved towards a much simpler technique based on
getting patients to disclose what they already had stored somewhere in their
mind. It was reflections on his time with Bernheim that enabled Freud to put
the pieces together that would shape his new approach. He recalled that
when a patient had come out of a hypnotic state they had no recollection of
what had happened while in that state.
But Bernheim maintained that the memory was present all the same;
and if he insisted on the subject remembering, if he asseverated that
the subject knew it all and had only to say it, and if at the same time
he laid his hand on the subjects forehead, then the forgotten
memories used in fact to return, hesitantly at first, but eventually in a
flood and with complete clarity. I determined that I would act in the
same way. (1925, S.E. Vol. XX; 28).
It should be noted that the techniques that had so impacted Freud such as
Charcot's hypnotic suggestion, Bernheim's forced remembering and Breuer's
cathartic process were all reliant on first placing the subject into a hypnotic
state. It was Freud who would now begin to part from this trend until by 1898
he no longer used hypnosis at all. He was coming to realize that hypnosis
was in fact unnecessary and not worth the emotional trouble it often caused.
My patients, I reflected, must in fact 'know' all the things which had
hitherto only been made accessible to them in hypnosis; and
assurances and encouragement on my part, assisted perhaps by the
touch of my hand, would, I thought, have the power of forcing the
forgotten facts and connections into consciousness. (1925, S.E. XX;
28).
This hypnosis free technique would become known as 'free association'
because its central objective was to get the patient to give voice to all
thoughts that entered the mind while pursuing a certain topic, regardless of
their seeming relevance to the problem at hand. The development of free
association is of central importance to the discovery of the dynamic
unconscious. Like a detective who does not ignore the value of seemingly
unrelated clues, Freud progressively saw that the content of these disparate
conscious articulations actually may be related at another level. A level
where they were part of an unbroken causative chain of ideas. And so it was
during such periods of his patients relaxed verbalizing that Freud was able to
make the fundamental observations which allowed him to penetrate the
realm of the unconscious proper.
Thus by 1892/3 the stage was set for Freud to turn his observations
and speculations into theory. The one time neurologist and research
scientist who had made a name for himself in histology and Central Nervous
System research was now on the verge of psychoanalysis. From Charcot he
had gleaned that hysterical symptoms could be produced by ideas and thus
have a psychogenic origin. Libeault and Bernheim had enabled him to
observe that there could be mental processes that have causative power,
which nevertheless were not accessible to the patients consciousness.
Finally, Breuer's cathartic method and Freud's own early attempts at free
association had confirmed that his patients often knew the traumatic idea(s)
or event(s) that had caused their symptom, but they seemed to resist such
knowledge and needed help in brining it into conscious awareness. All these
observations would now be formulated into the psychoanalytical theories of
the 1890's. Although Freud does not present a concise theory of the
unconscious mind until the following century, it is in this last decade of the
nineteenth century where the foundations for a dynamic unconscious are
built and the mechanisms of it's operation discovered.
Chapter Two
CHAPTER TWO:
EARLY FORMULATIONS OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS AND THE MECHANISM OF
REPRESSION, 1890-1899.
In 1892 Freud had undertaken to translate several of Charcot's work's
fronn French Into English. Of particular importance were the Tuesday
Lectures which gave account of many of the phenomena Freud had observed
with him during the trip to Paris in 1885. Having now the benefit of seven
years hindsight, Freud seemed compelled to add a brief but very salient
outline of his own theorizing with respect to hysterical attacks. Thus, in a
footnote to Charcot's interpretation of one such attack Freud presents his
own ideas - a contribution somewhat out of the scope of a translator!
I avail myself of the opportunity offered in the text in order to lay
before the reader an independent view of hysterical attacks...
I have attempted to meet the problem of hysterical attacks along a
line other than descriptive, and by examining hysterical patients in a
hypnotic state I have arrived at new findings, a few of which I will
mention here. The core of a hysterical attack in whatever form it may
appear, is a memory, the hallucinatory re-living of a scene which is
significant for the onset of the illness. The content of tfie memory \s
as a rule either a psychical trauma which is qualified by it's
intensity to provoke the outbreak of hysteria in a patient or is an
event which, owing to its occurrence at a particular moment, has
become a trauma,.... A trauma would have to be defined as an
accretion of excitation in the nervous system, wfiicti ttie latter has
been unable to dispose of adequately by motor reaction. A hysterical
attack is perhaps to be regarded as an attempt to complete the
reaction to the trauma. (1892, S.E. 1; 137).
In this brief account the essential features of Freud's theories for the
ensuing decade are introduced. Of particular importance is the notion of a
memory of a traumatic event, which if intense enough may provoke the onset
of hysteria.
During the remainder of 1892, Freud developed these ideas further
with his friend Joseph Breuer. The culmination of this partnership is the joint
paper On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary
Communication (1893). In this paper hysteria was seen as the result of a past
event that provoked the initial symptom(s) and was then deliberately
forgotten from consciousness although not lost from the psyche.
A chance observation has led us, over a number of years, to
investigate a variety of different forms and symptoms of hysteria, with
a view to discovering their precipitating cause - the event which
provoked the first occurrence, often many years earlier of the
phenomenon in question. (1893, S.E. 2; 3).
The "event' was invariably associated with trauma at the time and as a result
the patient usually did not want to talk about it. Of greater significance to
Freud was the idea that the patient may be "genuinely unable to recollect
[and have] no suspicion of the causal connection between the precipitating
event and the pathological phenomenon." (1893;3).
Hysteria is seen as a pathological phenomenon which has a
precipitating cause in some trauma. The connection between the trauma and
the symptom may be clear and direct or it may be symbolic. The operative
cause of the symptom is not the physical event, but the affect (e.g. fright,
anxiety, shame, or guilt), that is, the psychical trauma. The memory of this
trauma (the ideational representative) "acts like a foreign body which long
after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work."
(1893; 6). The therapeutic effect of psychotherapy is based on the notion that
a trauma evokes a memory and affect which remain active in the psyche after
the trauma is consciously forgotten causing other behaviors (symptoms).
Freud offered clinical observations as support for this notion.
... we found,... that each individual hysterical symptom immediately
and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing to
light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in
arousing its accompanying affect, and when the patient had
described that event in the greatest possible detail and put the
affect into words (1893;6).
That the symptom would immediately disappear when the psychical process
which originally led to it was vividly recalled and articulated led Freud to
make the classic conclusion; 'Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.' In
developing his explanation of hysteria, Freud goes on to introduce the
concepts of catharsis, abreaction, repression, and the unconscious (n.b.
here, the latter is still being thought of simply as a second conscious).
When some traumatic event provokes an affect, there is always some
'reaction' to it. Freud is not very clear in what he meant by 'reaction', stating
only that it was "the whole class of voluntary and involuntary reflexes, ...[in
which] the affects are discharged." I suggest that at this point in Freud's
thinking it is best understood simply as 'taking action' to alleviate the affect,
e.g. by crying, raging, confronting, or taking revenge. A problem arises when
this is denied.
If the reaction is suppressed, the affect remains attached to the
memory. An injury that has been repaid, even if only in words, is
recollected quite differently from one that has had to be accepted."
(1893;8).
Freud termed this re-living (in feeling, action, or imagination) of the situation
that caused the conflict - abreaction. The desired result of abreaction is
catharsis (i.e., release of the tension and anxiety associated with the
suppressed affect). Freud suggested that healthy people carry out this
process successfully all the time.
... a person's memory of a humiliation is corrected by his putting the
facts right, by considering his own worth, etc. In this way a normal
person is able to bring about the disappearance of the
accompanying affect through the process of association." (1893;9).
As a result the memory is free to fade away with time and thus cease to be
affectively operative. However, this process breaks down in the case of the
hysteric for whom the memories "persist for a long time with astonishing
freshness and with the whole of their affective coloring." (1893;9).
At this point Freud introduces the necessity of another realm of
mental life outside the conscious.
These memories, unlike other memories..., are not at the patients
disposal. On the contrary, these experiences are completely absent
from the patients memory when they are in a normal psychical state,
or are only present in a highly summarized form. (1893;9).
Freud is then obliged to acknowledge "abnormal states of consciousness in
which these pathogenic ideas arise". He suggests this distinction is
analogous to the classical notion of 'splitting of consciousness' and refers to
the abnormal states of consciousness as 'hypnoid states' (this term was
actually introduced by Breuer). 'The ideas which emerge in them are very
intense but are cut of from associative communication with the rest of the
content of consciousness." (i.e., dissociation).
One of the factors that may stop sufficient abreaction from occurring
is the mechanism of repression which is first introduced in the 1893 paper. In
such a case abreaction could not occur because the trauma may be "a
question of things which the patient wished to forget, and therefore
intentionally repressed from his conscious thought and inhibited and
suppressed"(1893;10). This is not to be confused with gradually forgetting
unpleasant experiences, but is rather an instant reaction to the realization of
a traumatic idea which occurs before abreaction is possible.
It may therefore be said that the ideas which have become
pathological [ (or repressed) ] have persisted [ (outside of
consciousness) ] with such freshness and affective strength because
they have been denied the normal wearing away process by means of
abreaction and reproduction in states of uninhibited association"
(1893;11).
In the following year, 1894, Freud (writing independently from Breuer)
develops the notion of repression as 'intentional forgetting' in The Neuro
Psychoses of Defense. The latter is actually the first of two papers on the
Neuro-Psychoses of defense, the second part to come in 1896. Building on
the concepts introduced in the Preliminary Communication, Freud now gives
expression, if not overtly, at least by implication to many of the fundamental
theoretical notions of psychoanalysis making this the most important
theoretical paper of the early period. The term 'defense' appears in this paper
for the first time as does the notion of a 'sum of excitation' (soon to be called
'cathexis'), and the early formulation of what would become the 'pleasure
principle'.
Placing this paper within the wider context of Freud's thinking during
these years is important. The paper was finished in January, 1894, which
places it a year after the publication of the joint Preliminary Communication
and eighteen months before Freud's first attempt at a systematic
presentation of his views on Psychology as a science. That work. Project for a
Scientific Psychology i^ 895), proved overly ambitious and was left unfinished
and unpublished by Freud. This remained the case until 1950 (eleven years
after Freud's death) when the work was finally published. The Project was
written between the two papers on the Neuro-Psychoses. It will not be dealt
with in its own right in this presentation of Freud's early thought as it requires
some background knowledge of neuropsychology and also because much of
its content was abandoned by its author as the transition from neurology to
psychology became complete. However, before moving on it will be helpful
to briefly assess the impact the Project had on other writings of the time.
Freud was still actively involved in neurological publications up
until 1899, not the least of which was a sizable contribution to Nothnagel's
great encyclopedia of medicine where he consolidated much of his recent
work on Cerebral Palsies in children. The Project ^as an attempt to integrate
this neurological expertise into the explanation of the emerging
psychological phenomena. As a result, many of the concepts employed in
the psychological works of the time are charged with neurological
assumptions. James Strachey outlines the Project's definitive contribution
in an editor's appendix in Vol.3 of his Standard Edition of Freud's works.
In his 'Project' two basic assumptions were laid down. The first was
the validity of the recent histological discovery that the nervous
system consisted of chains of neurones, the second was the idea that
excitation of the neurones was to be regarded as 'a quantity, subject
to the general laws of motion'. By combining these two assumptions'
we arrive at the idea of a "cathected" neurone filled with a certain
quantity, though at other times it may be empty (sic. S.E. Vol. 3:64).
It is easy to see that the notion of cathexsis of the neuron found its
way across to the psychological writings of the period. Freud seemed to be
working on the assumption that psychological entities should be describable
in neurological terms. This can be seen in the papers on hysteria. The
attempt was soon abandoned. Freud's later writings show virtually no interest
in the possibility of a neurological explanation of psychological events. In
fact this abandonment was essential for the development of psychoanalysis
proper. However, it is significant that the neurological underpinnings of the
Project affected the choice and conceptualization of some very important
terms developed in this period. This influence will be returned to in later
evaluations of Freud's conceptualizations. The point being made here in it's
historical context we can now turn to the first paper on the Neuro-Psychoses
of Defense.
Freud begins by developing the notion of "a splitting of
consciousness, accompanied by the formation of separate psychical
groups", a conceptualization he had briefly introduced in the Preliminary
Communication. Freud made a point of rejecting Janet's theory (current at
this time) which suggested that the split was due to some innate psychical
weakness. Such a conclusion simply didn't square with Freud's clinical
observations.
I was repeatedly able to show that the splitting of the content of
consciousness is the result of an act of will on the part of the patient;
that is to say, it is initiated by an effort of will whose motive can be
specified. By this I do not, of course, mean that the patient intends to
bring about a splitting of his consciousness. His intention is a
different one; but, instead of attaining it's aim, it produces a splitting
of consciousness (vol. 3; 47).
Freud now associates this process with 'defense' for the first time. In
discussing patients currently under analysis he noted that they had been
enjoying good mental health up until an intolerable idea suddenly presented
itself to their consciousness,
that is to say, until their ego was faced with an experience, an idea or
a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect that the subject
decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his
power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea
and his ego by means of thought-activity (1894, S.E. Ill;47).
This is the defensive nature of the ego at work.
Thus by 1894 we have an outline of Freud's first formulation of the
defense mechanism, repression, which is sometimes retrospectively referred
to as 'intentional' or 'motivated' forgetting". The key question to be asked
here is what does the term 'intentional' refer to? Does Freud provide a
specific mechanism by which this impelled forgetting occurs? As the
components are not gathered together by Freud and presented as a
systematic outline in these two papers the specific elements of the
mechanism are often overlooked. This has resulted in the truly
comprehensive nature of this early theory being missed by many scholars.
The fact is, a careful reading of the 1893-94 papers does allow one to
identify the specific elements necessary for repression to occur. As it is
usually this concept of motivated forgetting that is being used when attempts
have been made to test the concept of repression empirically, it will be
beneficial at this point to provide such a concise and systematic summary of
the mechanism of repression as it appears in the writings of 1893 and 1894.
The following points are apparent:
1/ It is the conscious awareness of an 'intolerable idea' that caused a
previously well person to show pathological symptoms.
2/ The thing which precipitates this symptom can be an event, idea or
feeling.
3/ The precipitating event, idea, or feeling arouses an affect which is
distressing and traumatic.
4/ In reviewing points one to three, Freud concludes that it was the
distress caused by the affect which impelled the forgetting of the
precipitating event.
5/ The connection between the precipitating event and the
subsequent pathological phenomenon may be 'obvious' or 'symbolic'.
Freud compared the latter to the relations healthy people form in
dreams.
6/ The precipitating factor does not simply release the symptom and
then fade away. "We must presume rather that the psychical traumas
- or more precisely the memory of the trauma - acts like a foreign body
which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent
that is still at work,...
'
(1893,S.E. 11:6).
7/ It is the 'memory of the trauma', not the trauma itself that is active
in the psyche, (Freud develops this latter as the 'ideational
representative' ).
8/ The symptom would immediately and permanently disappear when
one had 'succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the
event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying
affect,... Recollection without affect almost invariably produced no
result' (1893. S.E. Il;9).
9/ These memories which became the determinants of a hysterical
phenomenon are not to be equated with 'the fading of memories' or
common forgetting, for even wtien one may tfiink ttiey tiave been
forgotten, tfiey actually 'persist for a long time with astonishing
freshness and with the whole of their affective coloring' (1893, S.E.
11:9).
10/ The memories of the intolerable event, idea , or feeling "are
completely absent from the patients memory when they are in a
normal psychical state, or are only present in a highly summarized
form" (1893, S.E. Il;9).
These then are the specific elements of repression which form the
basis of the most fundamental of Freud's future theoretical notions. It should
be realized that 'the unconscious' is not an independently described theory
at this point. It's nature must largely be inferred from the writings that are
developing the notion of repression as an explanation of hysterical
phenomena. This is largely true of the early period of psychoanalysis. It will
be the 1900's before Freud begins to describe the theoretical nature of the
unconscious proper. Until then much can be gleaned from the closely
related work on repression.
Throughout the remainder of the 1894 paper, Freud continues to
develop the notion of repression, particularly as it relates to
psychopathology. The first major development is the notion of separating the
'energy' belonging to the affect of an idea from the idea itself and putting it
to use somewhere else. This is the best way for the ego (here =
consciousness) to remove the threatening idea and its affect.
The task which the ego, in its defensive attitude, sets itself of
treating the incompatible idea as 'non arrivee' simply cannot be
fulfilled by it. Both the memory-trace and the affect which is
attached to the idea are there once and for all and cannot be
eradicated. But it amounts to an approximate fulfillment of the task if
the ego succeeds in turning this powerful idea into a weak one, in
robbing it of the affect the sum of excitation - with which it is
loaded,... But the sum of the excitation which has been detached from
it must be put to another use. (1894, S.E. lll;48-49).
This early notion of a 'sum of excitation" which would soon be termed
cathexis, led to an immediate sophistication of the hypothesized
psychogenic origin of hysteria and obsessions and these revisions would
lead to the first major development of the concept of repression. Freud
writes, "In hysteria, the incompatible idea is rendered innocuous by its sum of
excitation being transformed into something somatic. For this I should like to
propose the name of conversion" (1894, S.E. Ill;49). So the development of
hysteria was now explained by
'
a psycho-physical aptitude for transposing
very large sums of excitation into somatic innervation"" (1894, S.E. Ill;50). If
however, a person lacked such an aptitude for "conversion", then when the
affect is separated from the incompatible idea, 'its affect, which has become
free, attaches itself to other ideas which are not in themselves incompatible,
and thanks to this 'false connection' those ideas turn into obsessional ideas'
(1894, S.E. Ill;53).
Freud then addressed the question of what event(s) could cause an
affect to be so distressing that it would give rise to a neurosis. His answer
was as follows;
' In all the cases I have analyzed it was the subject"s sexual
life that had given rise to the distressing affect, ..." (1894, S.E. Ill;52). This
point will be elaborated on in the second paper. For now Freud is content to
make it clear that the process occurs without conscious control.
Between the patient's effort of will, which succeeds in repressing the
unacceptable sexual idea, and the emergence of the obsessional
idea, ..yawns the gap which the theory here developed seeks to fill.
The separation of the sexual idea from its affect and the attachment
of the latter to another, suitable but not incompatible idea - these are
processes which occur without consciousness (S.E. vol. 3;53).
Here the dynamic and essential inter-relationship between the unconscious
and the mechanism of repression are evident. One cannot operate, and
indeed makes no sense without the other.
In the follow-up paper Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of
the Defense (1896), Freud elaborates on the nature of the sexual causality of
hysteria and obsessional neurosis. He begins by pointing out that the sexual
trauma is a childhood occurrence which has effect in adulthood. "These
sexual traumas must have occurred in early childhood [before eight to ten
years of age], and their content must consist of an actual irritation of the
genitals" (S.E. v.3; 166). It now becomes easier to see why it is the 'idea' of
the sexual trauma which is the most crucial factor.
... if the sexual experience occurs during the period of sexual
immaturity and the memory of it is aroused during or after maturity,
then the memorv will have a far stronger excitatory effect than the
experience did.... An inverted relation of this sort between real
experience and memory seems to contain the psychological
precondition for the occurrence of a repression. (S.E. V.3; 167n).
Freud now ties differences in the circumstances of childhood
sexuality to differences in the aetiological circumstances of hysteria and
obsessional neurosis. He hypothesized that if the child was the passive
participant (i.e. sexually seduced by an adult or another child), then hysteria
would result. According to Freud this is why hysteria is far more common
among females. However, if the child was the active participant (i.e. the
initiator or seducer), then obsessional neurosis would be more likely to
result. Thus, the "fact that obsessional neurosis shows a visible preference
for the male sex*.
It is important to realize that while at this stage Freud is treating
these sexual traumas as actual events, he would come to reject this idea. In a
footnote, added to the discussion outlined above in a 1924 review, Freud
acknowledges:
This section is dominated by an error which I have since repeatedly
acknowledged and corrected. At that time I was not yet able to
distinguish between my patients phantasies about their child hood
years and their real recollections. As a result I attributed to the
aetiological factor of seduction a significance and universality it did
not posses. (S.E. V.3; 168n).
The significance of this correction can hardly be over estimated. The
realization that phantasy played a crucial if not dominant role in mental life
would become the necessary foundation for all the mature forms of
psychoanalytic theory. Furthermore, it would revolutionize this literal
conception of childhood sexual trauma into the greatly refined theories of
infantile sexuality and the Oedipal complex. This clarification should be
kept in mind when discussing the aetiology of the neuroses and the role of
sexuality in childhood.
A further development at this point was the introduction of the
concept of the 'return of the repressed' which grew out of Freud's analysis of
the nature and mechanisms of obsessional neurosis (1896). Freud presented
the idea in a simple formula: 'Obsessional ideas are invariably transformed
self-reproaches which have re-emerged Uom repression and which always
relate to some sexual act that was performed with pleasure in childhood'
(1896, S.E. Ill;169). In the first instance, a child is involved in the seduction of
another child. This provides the 'germ' of neurosis that will make repression
possible. This period ends at the onset of sexual maturity, marking the
beginning of the second period. "A self reproach now becomes attached to
the memory of these pleasurable actions' and is replaced by primary
symptoms of defense such as shame and distrust. The third period is one of
apparent health, which lasts while the defense is successful resulting in the
memories of the first two periods remaining repressed from conscious
psychic functioning. "The next period, that of the illness, is characterized by
the return of the repressed memories - that is, therefore, by the failure of the
defense' [viz. repression] (1896, S.E. Ill; 169). As a result, obsessional ideas
are produced which were defined as 'transformed self-reproaches which have
re-emerged from repression'.
What are these 'transformed self-reproaches'? As far as conscious
life is concerned they are a compromise between the repressed ideas and
the repressing ones. Thus, these compromised ideas are related to both and
the psychoanalyst will use them to point back to the traumatic event, as well
as to confirm the source of the current repressing energy. While the
formulation of re-emerging repressed content at this stage only referred to
obsessions, by 1900 Freud had revised his theory of the nature and
mechanisms of hysterical symptom formation to include the notion of a
�return of the repressed'.
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The years 1896 and 1898 saw the appearance of two further papers
on the aetiology of the neuroses. It is fair to say that these papers essentially
contain nothing new but clarify and expand what had been laid down in the
Preliminary Communication and the two papers on Neuro-Psychoses.
The first of these papers, The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896) is mostly a
re-statement of the theoretical section of the second paper on the Neuro-
Psychoses. The sexual experiences of childhood are given a more detailed
treatment although still with the fundamental error of literalness which as we
have already noted. Sexual experiences were confirmed as being initiated by
adults. Strachey, in his editorial note points out that this paper in particular
displays an "increasing tendency to prefer psychological to neurological
explanations" (S.E. v.3; 190).
Two years later, after the completion of his promised contribution to
Nothnagel's medical encyclopedia, a new paper emerged; Sexuality in the
Aetiology of the Neuroses (1898). Again, the paper makes no significant
deviations from what has been laid down already. This lack of new ideas is
surprising in light of the fact that the previous summer (1897) marked the
beginning of the all important occurrence of Freud's 'self-analysis'. As Jones
points out "two important parts of Freud's researches are intimately
connected with his self-analysis: The interpretation of dreams, and his
growing appreciation of infantile sexuality" (1961:210). That the latter
receives virtually no hint in this paper is an interesting omission. Perhaps
Freud's self-analysis was still too new and immature to have solidified into
ideas that could be articulated at this point. More likely, Freud realized that
the new ideas which self-analysis produced would require a significant
matuhng of the whole system as it currently stood. This would not be realized
until 1900 and so it would have been difficult to introduce his new thoughts
on infantile sexuality without this base.
The same year also saw the publication of The Psychical Mechanism
of Forgetfulness (1898). This paper is significant because it marks the
beginning of a transference of Freud's theory of 'intentional forgetting' from
the realm of the abnormal to the realm of the everyday. It also marks the
beginning of Freud's notions of the unconscious and repression being seen
as fundamental mechanisms at work in all people (healthy and neurotic) and
in all situations (traumatic and mundane). Along with Screen Memories
(1899), it also gives the first clear expression of the results of Freud's self-
analysis. These two papers on memory and forgetting are not landmarks in
themselves, but they point clearly to the future direction that psychoanalysis
would take. They lay the foundation for the articulation of the new theory of
childhood sexuality by dealing with the related issue of memory failure and
in particular the notion of amnesia in early childhood.
The Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness (1898) is essentially a
recollection of a self analysis Freud conducted on his own inability to recall
a familiar name. In so doing he takes the first steps toward uncovering the
world of repression and the unconscious which underlie those seemingly
innocent "slip of the tongue' experiences. The theoretical side of this
phenomenon would be given detailed treatment in the book on parapraxes
(1901).
Screen memories (1899) was the final paper of the decade. It again
introduced some of the concepts that would become central to the next stage
in the development of Freud's thought. This will be found to be especially so
with regard to childhood amnesia and infantile sexuality.
Freud begins with the observation that the criteria for retaining
something in memory is the psychical significance of the experience. This is
so from the time memory forms a more or less constant chain of events from
middle childhood (7-10 years). "Whatever seems important on account of its
immediate or directly subsequent effects is recollected; whatever is judged
to be inessential is forgotten" (vol.3;303). Now, this is an obvious truism that
can be validated by reflection on one's own experiences. We all retain in
memory what is intrinsically or extrinsically significant, but tend to quickly
forget the uneventful, the boring, the insipid. However, there is one great
contradiction to all of this, which as Freud points out, lie in the "relatively
small number of isolated recollections which are often of dubious or
enigmatic importance" and which characterize the memories of early
childhood. He was fascinated by the paradox of memory that early childhood
manifests, that is, important things are not retained (infantile amnesia), but
seemingly insignificant events are. Laplanche and Pontalis summarize the
concept this way:
Phenomenologically, certain of these memories present themselves
with an exceptional clarity and persistence that contrasts strikingly
with the banality and innocence of their content - the subject himself
is surprised that they should have survived... Such memories, in so
far as they conceal repressed sexual experiences or phantasies,
Freud called screen memories" (1988; 411).
The primary mechanism at work here is displacement. As before a
traumatic event produces an affective memory, but unlike repression in
which the content of the memory is banished to the unconscious, now the
traumatic memory is replaced by, or substituted with another one. As Freud
describes it,
The result of the conflict is therefore that, instead of the mnemic
image which would have been justified by the original event, another
is produced which has to some degree associatively displaced the
former one. And since the elements of the experience which aroused
objection were precisely the important ones, the substituted memory
will necessarily lack those important elements and will in
consequence most probably strike us as trivial. (1899, vol.3).
Thus, the concept of a "screen memory' entails one whose significance is not
derived from its content, but from the relation that exists between this
memory and some other, that is, the one from which the content was
displaced and has since been suppressed.
Here we come to the end of our survey of the development of Freud's
thought over the first decade of his work. We have concentrated on this first
decade for several reasons. Firstly, it is here that the foundations are laid for
all future psychoanalytic theorizing. Whilst many of the core concepts that
have been introduced are reviewed, expanded, refined and systematized
during the years ahead, the basic logical qualities of these concepts are
most clearly formulated here.
Secondly, by concentrating on the first decade we get a clearer
picture of the impact other scholars have had on the initial development of
Freud's theories. Although psychoanalysis certainly finds it's formal
beginning with him, "it did not spring full grown from the brow of Freud"
(Thompson, 1955). Psychoanalysis as a theory was impacted by the thinking
of the scientific community of Freud's day. The influence of many great
thinkers including Meynert, Charcot, Bernheim, Fleiss, and Joseph Breuer
have been noted.
Finally, as will be seen in chapter 4, it is the theoretical formulations
of this period which are most closely related to the paradigms that have been
constructed by the empiricist who have tried to test Freud's theories in the
laboratory. Thus, it is imperative to be familiar with these earlier notions if
one is to assess adequately such empirical endeavors. With this background
in place, I shall now turn to Freud's more mature theorizing. In so doing the
discussion will be narrowed to deal only with the dynamic unconscious and
its main mechanism of repression. The goal is to trace the development of
Freud's understanding of the unconscious mind from this first decade
through to his most mature statements.
Chapter Three
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
^
UNCONSCIOUS IN FREUD.
As was noted in the introduction, the psychology of Freud's time was
almost exclusively interested in conscious content. The experimental
philosophers who followed in the tradition of Wundt were only concerned
with the controlled scientific study of the totality of conscious experience at
a given time. Freud did not deny the reality of such conscious experience but
he assigned it much less importance. What Freud discovered in the realm of
unconscious mental life made conscious experience seem like a periphery.
Because consciousness has the property of awareness (by definition) it
seems to be of greatest importance, but Freud was to show that it is precisely
the mental apparatus of which we are not aware upon which the majority of
psychic life is dependent.
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The first comprehensive development of the notion of the dynamic
unconscious came in the landmark publication The Interpretation of Dreams
(1900). In this two volume work Freud begins to systematize his earlier
notions into a topography of the mind which made distinctions between three
levels of consciousness; the unconscious (ucs.), which consists of all
aspects of psychic functioning of which we are not aware, the preconscious
(pes.), which consists of those elements of mental life which are not in
immediate awareness, but which are accessible, and finally the conscious
(cs.), consisting of the content of immediate awareness.
Freud initially seems to present these categories as separate
entities, but by the time he reaches the more theoretical discussion of the
seventh chapter he dispels such a myth by insisting that these states of
consciousness are more like points on a continuum varying from complete
awareness at one end to the hidden drives, instincts, and motives of
personality at the other. It is at this point that we experience the central
tension that this thesis will address; just what is the relationship between the
conscious and unconscious mental content? Freud's discussion in this
chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams has often been used by theorists to
argue that Freud did not draw a solid line between the conscious and the
unconscious systems. Typically they refer to a transparent and unitary
consciousness. By transparent, it is meant that the content of one system is
not completely blocked from another and by unitary, it is meant that the two
systems are different emphases of one whole, not two separate entities. It is
essential to clear up Freud's position on this issue.
Freud has certainly made misinterpretation of his position easy due
to his awkward explanations which if taken out of context could be taken as
proof for either side of the argument. For example, in the seventh chapter of
The Interpretation of Dreams he states:
It will be seen on closer consideration that what the psychological
discussion in the preceding sections invites us to assume is not the
existence of two systems near the motor end of the apparatus but the
existence of two kinds of processes of excitation or modes of its
discharge.... Nevertheless, I consider it expedient and justifiable to
continue to make use of the figurative image of the two systems. We
can avoid any possible abuse of this method of representation by
recollecting that ideas, thoughts and psychical structures in general
must never be regarded as localized in organic elements of the
nervous system but rather, as one might say, between them, where
resistance's and facilitation's provide the corresponding correlates
(1900: 610-11).
All Freud is saying here is that he does not intend for us to conceive of the
conscious and unconscious system as two separate localized organic
entities. They are not localized in an organic structure. However, this does
not mean that he is suggesting that the two systems are transparent in terms
of content. Although they have a shared source of psychical energy they
employ and discharge this quite independently. They are of like kind, but
have different functions and contents.
This chapter in his book places the unconscious system (consisting
of the unconscious and pre-conscious) as the foundation of mental life. The
conscious is a primary source of data, but it has so many gaps in it that it can
never give us an accurate picture of reality. In effect, the conscious is just a
sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities and as a result the
unconscious must be assumed to be the basis of psychical life.
The unconscious is the larger sphere, which includes within it the
smaller sphere of the conscious. Everything conscious has an
unconscious preliminary stage; whereas what is unconscious may
remain at that stage and nevertheless claim to be regarded as having
the full value of a psychical process. The unconscious is the true
psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us
[the conscious] as the reality of the external world, and it is as
incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the
external world by the communication of our sense organs{^900�.6^2-
13).
Freud was evidently not a naive realist.
In explaining the dynamics of this system Freud expanded the
notions of psychic energy and cathexis which he had introduced in 1894. Of
central importance was the concept of the pleasure principle which proposed
that all of psychical activity is aimed at producing pleasure and avoiding
unpleasure. The unconscious system is characterized by this principle.
Thus, by 1900 we have Freud's first full topography of the mind in
which nonconscious processes [preconscious and unconscious] dominate.
This initial topography is often referred to as the tripartite model in order to
distinguish it from a revised topography which Freud presents in 1923. Whilst
it is possible for preconscious content to move back and forth between
conscious and the unconscious, the content of the unconscious can "have
no such easy access to consciousness". This content was, in fact, actively
kept out of consciousness and as a result was given the name of unconscious
proper.
It must be realized that as a neurobiologist and a confirmed
behaviorist Freud was of the opinion that all behavior was caused. He had
concluded that the tradition of studying the content of immediate awareness
proved to be too fragmentary to be a reliable casual basis of behavior and so
turned to the unconscious proper for the causal explanations behind human
behavior. The bulk of The interpretation of Dreams and all of The
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), is a fascinating analysis of such
unconscious causal chains. Freud demonstrated that such disparate
phenomena as 'slips of the tongue', forgotten names, faux pas, dreams,
bungled jokes, etc., were not chances accidents at all, but rather were
behaviors which were completely consistent with the underlying causal
motivation of the unconscious personality.
This is the era in which unconsciously motivated behavior becomes
an obsession for Freud. Every patient became another piece of clinical
evidence which confirmed his conviction that all behavior, no matter how
seemingly trivial, was at least in part unconsciously motivated. The actual
mechanism by which something unconscious motivates behavior receives its
clearest exposition in the year of 1915, during which Freud publishes a
series of metaphysical papers that deal with the relationships between the
components of the tripartite system. Of particular relevance are The
Unconscious (1915), and Repression (1915). The paper dealing with the
unconscious contains few new developments and is just a synthesis of much
that was presented in The Interpretation of Dreams. Therefore, in order more
clearly to see the mechanisms which Freud envisaged were at work with
UMB's we shall look briefly at the paper on repression.
From a theoretical point of view this paper, like The Unconscious
does not contain very much 'new' information. By the time Freud had written
Repression nearly all of the ideas had been presented somewhere before, but
they were scattered in published works from 1893 1911. This was readily
admitted by Freud who refers to the paper as "a purely descriptive account of
repression based on clinical observation, ... even though we run the risk of
having to repeat unchanged much that has been said elsewhere" (1915:148).
However, it is the fact that this is a 'descriptive account based on clinical
evidence' that makes it a very useful practical companion to the theoretical
papers on the unconscious.
From the outset, the 1915b paper has abandoned talk of 'memories'
of traumatic events and now concentrates on 'instinctual impulses'. It is the
impulse which is said to pass into a state of repression not just the memory.
This is not a replacement of the mechanism which was outlined in the first
decade but rather an expansion of it to cover instincts in general. The
necessary condition for an instance of repression from the conscious to the
unconscious, or (more commonly), primal repression in which an
unconscious idea remains held in the unconscious (as when an ideational
representative seeks to enter consciousness but is denied) is that the
pleasure obtainable by an instincts satisfaction will be outweighed by the
unpleasure caused by it in some other place or time (due to irreconcilable
claims and intentions). But while this is now the case, the actual core of the
concept of repression remains the same as it was in 1893, namely , its
essence still lies in "turning something away, and keeping it at a distance,
from the conscious" (1915b: 147).
Another important qualification to the concept in this period is that
it is no longer considered a mechanism present from the beginning of life, in
fact, Freud now believes that "it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has
occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity" (1915b: 147).
Exactly what causes this cleavage, or at what time it occurs is not elaborated
on in this paper. It is significant also that what has been referred to as
'fixation' is now modified into a stage where the ideational representative of
an instinct is denied access into consciousness at the time of conception
and as a result of this a fixation occurs.
In this paper Freud articulates what one may have expected from his
work on parapraxes, forgetting, and jokes, that is, repression acts in a 'highly
individual' and 'exceedingly mobile manner'. It is individual in that each
single derivative of the repressed may have its own special vicissitude, and
mobile in that "repression is not to be regarded as an event which takes
place once, the results of which are permanent' (1915b:151). Constant
energy is expended, the unconscious pushing towards consciousness, the
conscious using counter pressure to balance it, being always on the look-out
for newly formed and sent out derivatives.
Based on this modification a clear picture of the mechanism of
repression in relation to UMB can be synthesized. Let us consider a case of
primal repression. The unconscious is made up of many instinctual drives
all of which adhere to the pleasure principle and seek to make their way into
consciousness where they have a chance for gratification. The conscious,
however, will not admit unconscious content and as a result unconscious
drives and impulses are kept in their hidden dungeon. In an effort to gain
entrance into the conscious the unconscious instinct will send out an
ideational representative which is sufficiently far removed from the
unconscious content that it will gain entrance into consciousness, perhaps
as a 'slip of the tongue', or as a dream, or as a phantasy. As the conscious
has no awareness of unconscious mental content the causes of these
behaviors will be unknown. They are, in fact, unconsciously motivated and
without the help of psychoanalysis to trace back the causal link of the
derivative to its unconscious source, the motivation of the behavior is never
clearly understood. Based on this summary it is easy to see how Freud can
conclude that practically all behavior is unconsciously motivated behavior
at some level.
The final period of Freud's work with which we will be concerned will
be that pertaining to the introduction of the second topography of the mind.
In The Ego and the Id (1923) the tripartite topography developed in 1900 is
superseded by the dynamic topography of the Id, Ego and Superego. This
change represents a move away from purely clinical description for which
the tripartite model had been sufficient, to an analysis of the dynamic
interrelationships of the various components of psychic functioning.
The dynamic topography sees psychic functioning as composed of
three agencies: the id, which is the primitive reservoir of instinctual energy
present from the time of birth. It is hedonistic, illogical, unorganized,
timeless, and knows "no values, no good or evil, no morality". It is simply the
instinctual pole of the personality which obeys only the pleasure principle
and the Nirvana principle which simply means that it seeks to maximize
affective pleasure, avoid affective unpleasure and to do so at the lowest
possible levels of excitation (energy use). Coffer & Appley (1984) provide a
particularly good sunnmary of id function.
The primary process, the means by which the id operates, consists in
discharging instinctual energy as soon as possible [cathexis], and in
disregard of reality. Ordinarily, such energy will be discharged, in the
derivative forms of impulses or wishes, through any directly available
motor channel. Thus reflexive bladder-emptying, spitting, blinking,
and thrashing would be used as means of direct discharge. However,
many wishes cannot be fulfilled so easily (as, for example, hunger,
where ingestible food must be present in the mouth). In these cases,
the primary process produces, from the memory system of the
organism, a mental image of the desired object and, by cathecting it
as if it were real, fulfills the wish..... It is unable to distinguish
between image and reality (1964:608).
The Ego begins its development as the child begins to interact with
the external environment. Like the id, it seeks to pursue pleasure and avoid
unpleasure, but as it does so in deference to external reality, thus it is said to
adhere to the reality principle. The Ego then must monitor the instinctual
impulses of the id which have no concern for reality. Unrealistic instant
gratification is replaced with realistic, often deferred gratification.
Instinctual energy is discharged with realistic interaction with the
environment, thus cathexsis becomes harder to achieve. It is harder because
the Ego must reduce the tension of the id by finding modes of releasing
instinctual energy which are realistic. For this reason Freud referred to it as
working by secondary processes in which continuous reality testing takes
place between the memory images of previous satisfiers and those present
in the environment. The ego is highly organized and able to liase between
the demands of external reality and the demands of the libidinal instincts of
the id.
Finally, Freud postulated a Superego which is a kind of higher ego which
has internalized the ethics and values of the child's culture as the ego
developed by trial and error learning. In particular the superego reflects the
standards and values of the parents incorporated into the personality of the
individual. The superego was often equated with the conscience by Freud
who saw it as a moral judge of the actions of the ego and ideas of the id. If
the superego detects fault in the actions of the ego it produces guilt, if it
detects validity it produces heightened self-esteem. As the ego strives to
heighten pleasure (within the bounds of reality), the intense guilt produced
by the super-ego is a very effective deterrent and stimulus to change a
behavior which produces guilt and shame.
In terms of the interrelation of these agencies, Freud suggested that
the id was entirely unconscious, having no access to the conscious except
by way of modification by the ego. The ego and the superego, however, can
be operative at all three levels of consciousness. The lines of demarcation
between the id, ego, and superego are deliberately vague. Below is a
reproduction of two figures Freud used to try to visualize the relationship.
The first is taken from Tlie Ego and the Id (1923) and the second from Freud's
New Introductory Lectures (1933).
Pcpt.-Cs. Pcpt.-Cs,
These figures highlight the interrelation of the three agencies. Just looking
at the diagrams it is evident that communication can occur between the
superego and ego, the ego and id. and the superego and the id. Furthermore,
the communication between the ego and superego could occur at the
conscious or preconscious levels.
The important point for our discussion is to realize that the id is the
entirely unconscious repository of instincts and as such its content can
never be present in consciousness except through a transformation of the
ego or superego (into an ideational representative / derivative). Thus, the
functional relationship of the content of the conscious and the unconscious
remains the same as it was under the tripartite model. It is important not to
equate 'ego' or 'superego' with consciousness. It is only the content of the
ego or superego which determines it consciousness. Of course this raises an
important difficulty for Freud, 'How can the ego know something which is
both conscious, as an ideational derivative, and unconscious, as an instinct,
at the same time?'. This is the issue of self-deception and as we shall see in
the analysis which follows, this is the claim which ultimately makes Freud's
notion of unconsciously motivated behaviors untenable.
Chapter Four
CHAPTER FOUR:
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS OF FREUD'S
THEORY I
Over the years, nearly every aspect of Freud's theorizing has been
'tested' in one way or another by empirical paradigms. In this section I shall
confine discussion to the empirical treatments of repression. I do this for
several reasons. Firstly, repression and the unconscious are inseparable
from the standpoint of empirical verifiability. If one falls so does the other, if
one is proven the other can ride on its proof. Secondly, of all the elements of
Freud's theory, repression is the most widely tested and has thus yielded the
largest and clearest body of empirical evidence. Repression is thus being
dealt with as our window on the unconscious. As has been shown in earlier
chapters, repression is the primary mechanism of the unconscious, it is
unconscious motivation 'at work' so to speak. As such it provides a more
concrete testing point than the wider more abstract notion of the
unconscious alone. This chapter will assess the empirical tests of repression
as they seek to give 'objective evidence' for or against the validity of the
notion.
Reviewing the history of empirical assessments of Freud's concept of
repression brought David Holmes to the conclusion that "despite over sixty
years of research involving numerous approaches by many thoughtful
investigators, at the present time there is no controlled laboratory evidence
supporting the concept of repression" (1990:96). This conclusion is correct.
However it is my contention that the reason for this state of affairs is
theoretical and not methodological as Holmes (1972,1974,1990) has
claimed. I propose that it is the inadequate conceptualizations of the
dynamic unconscious and repression inherent in these studies that have
resulted in empirical paradigms which are testing something other than
Freud's concepts. It will be suggested, therefore, that it is for theoretical
reasons that all the empirical works reviewed should be rejected (although
one can certainly find many methodological inadequacies in addition).
At the center of the theoretical objection to these empirical
assessments is the question of whether the paradigms ever come close to a
facsimile of the specific conditions Freud saw as necessary for repression to
occur. However, we are then faced with the dilemma raised in previous
chapters, namely that the concepts of the dynamic unconscious and
repression and their specific antecedents changed significantly in Freud's
theorizing from 1892-1939. As a result, when an attempt is made to replicate
Freud's concept, one must state clearly just what understanding they assign
to it. It should be noted that this is not a problem for Freud, but rather for the
experimenter. There is nothing 'wrong' or 'unscientific' about making
modifications to a concept as one makes new and relevant observations, but
it does require that any subsequent assessor be aware of the case. When a
concept has several different emphases, it is the task of the experimenter to
acknowledge this and clearly show which connotation of the concept is
being tested. It is exactly at this most fundamental conceptual level, that of
definition, that many empiricists display their inadequacy. For example,
Davis (1987, 1990) reports seven experiments which could all be classified
under the heading of 'repression as unconsciously motivated forgetting', a
conceptualization, one will recall, which was developed by Freud in the
writings of 1893 and 1894. Yet the only original work by Freud that Davis has
cited, or seemingly read, is the 1915 revision paper Repression, and
furthermore, this not until her experimental work was well under way as she
herself admits:
I was not particularly familiar with Freud and indeed, did not read
Freud's ([1915]/1957) seminal paper on repression until the
completion of the first study here. (1990:338).
As a result Davis bases her conceptualization of repression on one
sentence in the revision paper which states that "the essence of repression
lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the
conscious" (1915:147). Davis is not alone in this. The cited statement is
without doubt the most often quoted definition of repression given in the
introduction of all the empirical assessments of the concept. Perhaps this is
because it is simple and general and therefore can encompass just about
any formulation of repression and the unconscious that the experimenter has
chosen to adopt. This, however, is simply inappropriate. It is the job of the
assessor to replicate the specifications set down by the theory not to stretch
the theory to cover his or her own interpretation of it. Had Davis, or others,
been referring to some 'general' or novel idea of repression the issue of
definition would become relative and contextual. When, however, the
concept 'repression' is associated with a particular person, in this case
'Sigmund Freud', then there can be no room for the assessors own
interpretation of Freud's concept. Exactly what Freud meant when he used
the term is all that is relevant.
Of course, there may be generally held neo-Freudian notions of
repression which are more readily testable. I am not concerned with this
possibility here. The point here made applies only to those empiricists who
make a claim to actually be assessing Freudian repression. I think that
chapter two has made it fairly clear that a set of necessary and sufficient
criteria can be accurately distilled from Freud's writings as a basis for such
testing, it is whether or not these conditions can be replicated in the
laboratory which is the issue at stake.
The vast majority of the empirical assessments of Freud's concept
are invoking an idea of repression akin to it's first formulation as motivated
forgetting. This in itself is a questionable approach. As I have outlined,
Freud's mature psychoanalytic theories of the 1930's saw the dynamic
unconscious and repression as part of a tripartite topography of psyche
functioning. To assess fairly a theory that has evolved, one must assess it in
its most mature form. It is rather redundant to critique a theory in which the
originator has already identified weakness and subsequently modified.
However, in this case sonne validity is maintained by the fact that the
fundamental qualities of the dynamic unconscious and repression as given
in the 1890's remain fairly consistent throughout Freud's work. The later
modifications mainly relate to their specific workings and particularly their
interrelations with other psychoanalytic entities (such as the Id, Ego and
Superego).
Given that the assessment of repression in its earliest form of
'motivated forgetting' is potentially useful, it is still the case that very few
assessors make any reference to Freud's own conceptualization of
repression in this context. Most have chosen to start with the broad definition
given in the revision paper and then proceed to test a notion of motivated
forgetting that bears little or no relation to the one specified by Freud quite
clearly in 1893-1894. This is inexcusable. The 1915 definition of repression
only claims to give the essence of it. In no way was it intended to be a
concise enough statement to be submitted to empirical testing. If
empiricists wish to be fair to 'motivated forgetting' then they should begin
with the specific criteria laid down by Freud in his early writings. If they do
not do this they inevitably end up assessing a concept of their own making
which is always an impostor forced to use the name of Freudian repression.
As discussed in Chapter Two, Freud's specifications for identifying
repression as motivated / intentional forgetting were outlined in the papers.
On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena {^ 893) and The
Neuro-Psychoses of Defense {^894). To highlight the conceptual
inadequacies of current empirical paradigms, I briefly will re-state the
relevant points that should be accounted for in any experimental replication
of motivated / intentional forgetting if it is to be true to Freud's formulations.
1. Repression is preceded by an event, idea or feeling wtiicti is
'intolerable '.
2. Conscious awareness of the 'intolerable idea' produces a symptom.
3. The event, idea, or feeling produce an affect which is distressing
and traumatic.
4. The distress of this intense affect necessitates forgetting the
'intolerable'.
5. The memory of the trauma remains active but not in awareness.
6. The symptom disappears when the memory of the event is recalled
with its accompanying affect.
While this is a greatly telescoped version of Freud's formulations at
that time, it does provide the minimum criteria one would expect to be
present in any study claiming to replicate Freud's notion of motivated
forgetting. I am not suggesting that this is an easy task from an empirical
point of view. Although these steps are clearly presented in Freud's writings I
would not concur with Fisher and Greenberg (1979) when they claim that the
phenomena dealt with by Freud are "not so much more complicated than
those dealt with by other theorists" (1979:9). As we will now see, it is a matter
of great difficulty to replicate empirically even those few conditions I have
outlined, in fact, at the present time, I would suggest it is not possible at all.
One of the "classic" experimental paradigms for testing repression
was developed by Zeller (1950), and has been since used with various
modifications. It consists of having an experimental and control group learn
a list of words and then asking them to recall the same a short time later. It is
predicted that there will be no significant difference between the groups at
this stage. The experimental group is then subjected to some ego threat^
such as negative personality feedback or failure on some other task (while
the controls are not). On a subsequent recall test of the original list, it is now
usually found that the experimental group can recall fewer items, the
assumption being that the negative affect aroused by the feedback
generalizes to the memory task causing repression. Finally the experimental
group is then debriefed, that is, the negative affect, 'anxiety', is lifted. Both
groups are then re-tested for recall on the original list and found to be similar
again, seemingly good evidence for both repression_an6 the return of tfie
repressed. This paradigm has been used with similar results by other
experimenters (e.g. Flavell, 1955).
This experimental tradition has been rejected by Holmes (1972) as
providing no acceptable evidence for repression; he offers convincing
methodological objections, and produces viable counter explanations, such
as response competition. However, if Holmes' aim was simply to show that
these experiments are not acceptable as evidence for repression he could
1 The term 'ego threat' gives an initial impression that Zeller is testing Freud's theory in it's mature
topographical nature (the second tripartite model). I suggest that this is not the case. It seems clear that
Zeller's paradigm is really testing something akin to Freud's earliest presentation of repression as
'motivated forgetting'.
have saved himself the trouble of detailed methodological objections by
noting that this experimental paradigm does not replicate Freud's basic
conditions at a conceptual level.
In Freud's formulation, the distressing affect (in this case anxiety) is
the direct result of conscious awareness of an intolerable idea which has its
basis in a specific event. There is no relationship between this and Zeller's
model. Firstly, in Zeller's model there is no intolerable idea, event, or feeling,
which precedes repression. The list of words that are learnt are neutral and
therefore would not be expected to cause repression, and nothing ever
happens to change this. The anxiety caused by a separate situation (e.g.
negative personality feedback) would not be expected to cause repression of
a thematically unrelated task (the word list) simply because the two occurred
around the same time. This seems more like a classical conditioning
paradigm then repression. Motivated forgetting in one place is not the result
of some generalized free floating anxiety that comes from another. Its
motivation is specific; an event which is intolerable produces an idea or
memory of it which is also intolerable when consciously encountered and it
is such an encounter which leads to the distress. Therefore, if anything in
this experimental paradigm were to be repressed, it should be the memory of
the failure or the "negative feedback' not the items on the neutral word list.
Furthermore, even if this flaw were overlooked, it is highly unlikely that the
'trauma' of failing a task in a university experiment, or of getting some
negative personality feedback from an experiment, is in any way able to be
equated with the trauma that is necessary to produce an intolerable idea
and thus force the dynamic elements of Freud's theory into action.
Secondly, Zeller's conceptualization of the return of the repressed
also bears no relation to Freud's concept. Zeller observed that the decrease
in recall of the original word list after the anxiety was introduced actually
returned to pre-anxiety levels when the anxiety was removed. The fact that
subjects could recall more items when anxiety was removed was claimed to
be evidence for a 'return of the repressed'. However, in Freud's writing a
return of the repressed never referred to the point when a person became
consciously aware of previously repressed material as a result of a reduction
in anxiety. When traumatic ideational representatives were repressed, Freud
always pointed out that they were not lost but remained active, pushing
towards consciousness. However, they cannot return to consciousness due
to counter pressure, so secondary formations are used, derivatives of the
unconscious instinct, which can emerge into consciousness only because
they are primarily unrecognizable. Clearly this bears no relation to Zeller's
obsen/ed improvement in recall after his subjects had their anxiety relieved.
Paradigms like Zeller's reduce Freud's dynamic model of motivated
forgetting of traumatic ideas, events, or feelings, to simple recall differences
on a list of neutral words under Low versus High anxiety conditions. The two
bear little conceptual relation.
This tendency to overlook the fact that it is a matter of great
difficulty to produce an experimental paradigm which is true to Freud's
notions did not stop with Zeller. Holmes (1974,1990) and Bower (1990) review
a wide variety of approaches to the experimental study of repression. They
include studies on the differential recall of pleasant and unpleasant
experiences, completed and uncompleted tasks, and stressful and non-
stressful environments. The reviewers spend a lot of time criticizing these
approaches methodologically but never acknowledge that they do not meet
the basic requirements for repression at a conceptual level.
In a review of studies on the differential recall of material that is
associated with ego threat as compared with that which is not, Holmes (1974)
begins the paper with "four generally agreed upon aspects of the
hypothesized nature of repression" and states that these should constitute a
"minimal frame of reference in which to work" (1974:632). These aspects are:
1. Repression is specifically designed, motivated selective forgetting.
2. Repression is not under conscious control.
3. Repressed material is not lost but 'stored in the unconscious.
4. Repression can be divided into primal repression and repression
proper.
These minimum criteria for repression are in agreement with Freud's
own specifications and admirably representative of his thinking. They are, in
fact, the kind of representations of Freud's position, which I have been
arguing should be forming the basis of empirical projects. However, Holmes
subsequent review of a range of empirical studies, both for and against
repression, and the thoughtful methodological criticisms of these are
meaningless. None of them has been able to account for his own criteria that
repression be unconscious. As Erdeiyi and Goldberg (1974) point out,
it would have sufficed to spell out his four minimal criteria and to
point out, quite correctly, that no experiments exist (and we would
add, could exist) that simultaneously satisfied his fourfold
conceptualization. (1979:360).
As none of the experiments cited by Holmes meets his criteria that
repression is not under conscious control, he should have dismissed them on
theoretical grounds. However, even when the failure to do this is forgiven,
every one of these approaches to the assessment of repression suffers from
the same problem as Zeller (1950), namely a lack of understanding, and thus
an inability to recreate Freud's conditions for repression to occur.
Bower (1990) refers to married couples learning to avoid topics of
conversation (such as financial difficulty) which would disrupt current
happiness, as a type of repression. He even states that when he himself
thinks of such a topic, he consciously stops himself and thinks of a pleasant
activity. However, in Freud's formulation of repression as 'motivated
forgetting', the forgetting is not a conscious casual act. It is impelled by the
deep trauma caused by a thought or event in order to protect the psyche, that
is, it is an unconsciously motivated behavior. Further, conscious avoidance
of unpleasant topics of conversation has nothing to do with repression.
Nothing in Bower's example is actually repressed, but only avoided. Later in
the same paper Bower suggests that self questioning (e.g. where did I leave
my car keys?) produces a cycle of ;
retrieving the next thought in a sequence as the current idea or
image in working memory triggers the next associated idea to which
it is linked (1990:221).
The suggestion is that this is equivalent to Freud's technique of free
association. Again, this is an all to common example of the complete lack of
understanding of the fundamental elements of Freud's theory that is
prevalent in empirical assessments. The chain of thought set in motion by
tracing the location of one's keys is not thematically 'free'. Free association
was "the method according to which voice must be given to all thoughts
which enter the mind" (Laplanche & Pontalis , 1988,169). Searching for the
location of a specific object is a deliberate and thematically determined
process.
Finally, primal repression has received much attention in the past
decade, being empirically tested by the paradigm of 'perceptual defense'
which is considered analogous to it (Erdeiyi & Goldberg, 1979,1990; Holmes,
1990; Kihistrom & Hoyt, 1990; Sackeim & Gur, 1972). In a typical perceptual
defense paradigm, stressful (usually 'dirty') and non-stressful words are
flashed on a screen for a very short period of time. The latency of subject's
responses (reading the word aloud) is measured as an indication of primal
repression ( defending against the traumatic words by 'not seeing them').
This paradigm is again conceptually inadequate. It is presented by cognitive
and learning theorists many of whom see consciousness as unitary, thus
creating a conceptual impossibility in speaking of perceptual defense
because it entails the logical paradox of claiming that an individual may
perceive and not perceive at the same time. This is not a problem for Freud
who presented a non-unitary conceptualization of consciousness.
The purpose of this chapter has not been to highlight the empirical
strength or weakness of various 'scientific' claims about repression, but to
show that conceptual inadequacies in the empirical paradigms mean that
they should be rejected as assessments of the usefulness of Freud's theory.
They are undoubtedly very useful pieces of research on differential recall
phenomena but they tell us nothing about repression. The empiricists seem
to be unaware of the fact that to replicate Freud's notion of repression they
must begin with a consciousness which is non-unitary, that is, one in which
the unconscious is assumed to be functionally autonomous from the
conscious. The few researchers who have realized this (such as Holmes) and
included it in the necessary and sufficient criteria for repression, have not
been able to produce a paradigm that can account for it.
Finally, Holmes claim that 'repression' should be subject to a 'truth
in packaging' law because it has no 'proof may not be entirely reasonable.
What eventually leads to the acceptance or rejection of a theory of human
behavior? The answer is debated, but I would suggest that its perceived
usefulness, that is, its ability to explain the observed behaviors, to stimulate
thoughtful research, and to remain free from invalidating conceptual
criticisms, must be included. Freud's theory has certainly stimulated
volumes of research, some claiming to validate and others negate certain
aspects of it. Furthermore, it has remained remarkably rigorous in resisting
purely conceptual criticisms. So the issue at hand is whether or not it
actually 'explains the observed behaviors'. To my mind this must necessitate
the issue of truth. The ultimate question is whether or not Freud's theories are
true explanations of reality. I do not concur with Edelson's conclusion that:
Such properties as truth and falsity are not properties of a
conceptual analysis, or of decisions about what domain to study, or
what concepts to use in studying it. (Edelson, 1988: xix).
The point of this chapter is that the conclusion regarding the 'truth'
or 'falsity' of Freud's theories has been little helped by the empiricism
applied to date. In the absence of any widely acceptable falsifying empirical
evidence one could not be said to hold a 'false belief if one accepts a
psychoanalytic explanation of behavior unless it can be shown that the
theory is not, in fact, an true explanation of what one observes to take place
in reality. Then, regardless of how theoretically rigorous or stimulating it may
appear it is not an acceptable explanation of the observed phenomenon. In
the following chapter we shall assess whether psychoanalysis is indeed a
true theoretical explanation of observed human behaviors.
Chapter Five
CHAPTER FIVE:
THEORETICAL ASSESSMENTS OF
FREUD'S THEORY. ^
The preceding chapter has highlighted the failure of the empirical
tradition to produce a statement of the necessary and sufficient criteria for
an instance of Freudian repression to occur and therefore, to produce an
empirical paradigm that could test it. As a result it is very difficult to
determine to what extent any of their reported results should bear on the
ontological status of the concept. It is the contention of this thesis that the
most fruitful way to assess the status of Freud's concept of unconsciously
motivated behavior is to subject it to a theoretical analysis, testing it for
serious logical flaws, contradictions and conceptual confusion's and finally
for moral and theological adequacy. The notion proposed by Holmes
(1972,1974,1990) and others, that the usefulness' of repression and indeed of
psychoanalysis is general, must be determined solely on the basis of
empirical support is rejected. If the theory is shown to be conceptually
rigorous then it is the task of empiricists to produce an acceptable
experimental paradigm to test it. If it is not, then the theory is of little value at
its most fundamental level - that of conceptual validity and as such should
be rejected on that basis alone.
In order to make some assessment of the notion of UMB's, this
chapter will deal with several of the main logical objections to Freud's theory
found in the scholarship of the last few decades. The principle objections
raised in this process will then become the basis of the discussion of the
final chapter which attempts to apply the logical implications of these
problems to 'Christian psychologies' which rely heavily on Freudian
concepts and categories.
Whe Logical Paradox
A commonly stated problem for psychoanalysis and in particular the
theory of repression as a mechanism of unconsciously motivated behavior is
that referred to as the logical paradox (Erdeiyi and Goldberg, 1979; Pears,
1974; Sackeim and Gur, 1979; Sartre, 1973). This paradox is allegedly the
most serious flaw in Freud's theory.
The basis of the paradox is the assumption that repression can be
taken as a special case of the wider notion of mauvaise /b/(bad faith), or self-
deception, and as such is subject to the logical flaw outlined by Sartre
(1973):
The one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the
same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as the
deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one
deceived. Better yet, I must know the truth very exactly in order to
conceal it more carefully - and this not at two different moments,
which at a pinch would allow us to re-establish a semblance of
duality - but in the unitary structure of a single project (1973:129).
For Sartre, consciousness and being are a unitary phenomena. He
uses the idea of being-in-itself to denote the realization that something is
there. It is a pre-reflective awareness which is simply there and from which
awareness or consciousness and a 'sense of being' arises. Consciousness
and being are the two qualities of human existence that arise form being-in-
itself, how they arise is a metaphysical question and, therefore, irrelevant to
Sartre. As one ponders this consciousness an awareness of the self develops
which Sartre called the second consciousness of being-for-itself. Here the
emphasis is on humankind's unique ability to reflect on its own
consciousness. Finally, being-for-ottiers is the element of consciousness
which shares in the being-in-itself of other people. I include this brief
overview of Sartre's notion of consciousness to stress its unitary nature. It is
remarkable in that it avoids the classical Cartesian dualism between mind
and body by seeing consciousness and being as two transcendents of the
one construct, viz., being-in-itself.
Thus, for Sartre, people are only the sum of their actions and
purposes and these are not determined, but the result of free conscious
choices. As a result, Sartre views the determinism of Freud's unconsciously
motivated behaviors as an example of mauvaise foi (bad faith). The breaking
down of the human psyche into structural components with functional
autonomy is unacceptable. Sartre, of course, is approaching the issue of
consciousness from a different epistemological base from Freud. He is a
phenomenoloigist and Freud a biological determinist. This is the point of an
insightful paper by Richard Chessick.
Sartre and the phenomenologists insist on preserving the unity of the
psyche at all costs and object to compartmentalization of the psyche
in the fashion of Plato and later of Freud into any "realms' or
"structures' regardless of theory. This is a fundamental
epistemological difference which Sartre insists on again and
again, ...(Chessick,1984:232).
The important point for this discussion is that Sartre's epistemology,
regardless of whether one accepts it as an epistemological starting point or
not, does point to a serious logical flaw in Freud's system and this logical
flaw, or paradox, can stand on its own as we shall now see.
When one considers a case of other-deception (lying to non-self), no
logical paradox is involved. For example, 2 if John lies to Fred, John makes
Fred hold a belief, X John does not believe X, on the contrary, John believes
non-X, and furthermore, Fred will not be aware that John believes non-X.
There is no logical problem with these two individuals holding contrary view
points, even when one party (John) is aware that the other's view is a lie.
However, if we now transfer this model of other-deception to a situation of
self-deception so that the deceiver and the deceived are one and the same
person, then a new factor arises, namely, the one individual now holds two
2 Example adapted from Sackeim and Gur, 1977.
contradictory beliefs at the same time. This is the logical paradox inherent
in the notion of self-deception.
There are two possible courses of action which one can take at this
point to overcome the logical paradox. Firstly, one could reject the parallel
between a case of self-deception and other-deception. This in turn requires
that an alternative explanation of self-deception be provided which can be
shown to differ significantly from other deception and yet still maintain the
integrity of the concept. This has proven an illusive task. Alternatively, one
can point out that the validity of Sartre's argument rests solely on the
premise that consciousness is a "unitary structure of a single project". The
logical paradox only carries weight if consciousness is unitary and
transparent. If it is a unitary entity, aware of all the beliefs it holds (i.e.,
transparency), consciousness cannot logically hold X and non-X at the
same point of time (a requirement of repression). However, "when it is not
claimed that consciousness is necessarily unitary and transparent, it may be
possible to maintain the assimilation and yet avoid contradiction" (Sackeim
and Gur 1977:146).
When consciousness is referred to as unitary it is meant that it is
not divided into separate, localized, functional systems which are
autonomous in operation and control. A unitary view of the mind sees it as
one functional unit regardless of organization. When consciousness is
referred to as transparent it is meant that the contents of consciousness are
capable of reaching awareness and as a result they are not hidden or
unintelligible to other agencies within that consciousness. Some
philosophers and psychologists such as Descartes and Wundt held that
consciousness was both unitary and transparent (Leahey, 1987). But there is
a long tradition starting with Plato which asserted that if people are capable
of lying to themselves by holding contradictory beliefs, then consciousness
must necessarily be nonunitary and nontransparent. Sackeim & Gur (1977)
sums up Freud's place in this discussion well:
Freud's most radical claim and perhaps his most important
contribution to psychology is the idea that not only is
consciousness nonunitary and nontransparent but also that, at
times, selective awareness and nonawareness of the content of
consciousness are, in part, motivated (1977:141).
Sartre seems to have a fallacious understanding of the conscious /
unconscious distinction in Freudian psychoanalysis. He sees Freud's
notions of conscious and unconscious as opposite poles of one rod, which
are separated by "a censor, conceived as a line of demarcation with
customs, passport division, currency control, etc., [and this establishes] the
duality of the deceiver and the deceived" (Sartre, 1973: 129). The censor is
the dividing line in an otherwise unitary thing. However, one can argue that
this is not the understanding attributed to consciousness by Freud, who
along with a tradition of thinkers beginning with Plato, proposed that
consciousness was nonunitary and nontransparent (Brown, 1990). Sackeim
and Gur (1977) have shown that if it is assumed that consciousness is non-
unitary, then self-deception becomes a duplicate of other-deception and
therefore produces no logical paradox. If Freud's conscious / unconscious
distinction is nonunitary, then two autonomous systems can each hold
separate and contradictory beliefs without being logically problematic.
Furthermore, as the notion of nonunitary consciousness means that one
system is autonomous from the other, then by definition it also implies non-
transparency (the self-deceived who expresses belief X is not aware that
not-X is also believed).
It is my contention, however, that Freud conceptualized a
nontransparent conscious / unconscious division (which by parsimony also
implies a non-unitary view) only in theory. In practice Freud's nonunitary
consciousness is impossible to maintain. As such, the criticism that Freud's
notion of UMB should be rejected because of its inherent logical paradox is
invalid theoretically, but perhaps necessary in practice.
Sackeim and Gur (1977) provide four criteria for a case of self-
deception.
1. Tfie individual fields two contradictory beliefs (p and not-p).
2. These two contradictory beliefs are held simultaneously.
3. The individual is not aware of holding one of the beliefs (p or not-p).
4. The act that determines which belief is and which belief is not
subject to awareness is a motivated act.
These four necessary and sufficient criteria for a case of self-deception also
come very close to describing Freud's special case of 'repression'. In fact, if
we were to add the following criterion we could say that these five make up
the necessary and sufficient criteria for an instance of repression.
5. The belief which is not subject to awareness is stored in the
unconscious.^
The fifth point is crucial because Freud saw the unconscious not as
a 'second conscious', but as a functionally independent control system with
its own contents, mechanisms and energy. That is not to say that the
conscious and unconscious systems were so autonomous as to lead
separate lives. Happenings in one may have casual efficacy for happenings
in the other, but their contents and accessibility are distinct. By definition,
contents in the unconscious can effect behavior but they will not be known
by the conscious system. As Freud states, "to require that whatever goes on
in the mind must also be known to consciousness is to make an untenable
claim" (19150,144). It is untenable in the face of his clinical data which
suggested that non-conscious mental contents (i.e., 'ideas') do produce
changes in behavior (such as symptoms) which can be a form of
unconsciously motivated behavior. Furthermore, the contents of the
unconscious only become accessible to the conscious when strong sources
of resistance have been removed.
Freud defined 'conscious' very simply in A Note on the Unconscious
in Psycho - Analysis (1912),
...let us call 'conscious' the conception which is present to our
consciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only
meaning of the term "conscious (1912:135).
3 The question could be raised as to the real difference between this criterion and that of number 3. Here it is
important to realize that there are alternate explanations for what happens to data which is not in 'awareness'.
For example, some theorists would suggest that an idea not in awareness simply dissipates in to the neural
network and ceases to exist as an idea until recall necessitates it reconstruction (Hesslegrave, 1988). Thus, it
must be specified that for Freud information not in awareness is stored in the unconscious system as a whole
idea with causal efficacy.
According to this definition the essence of the conscious is 'awareness'. It is
for this reason that in the 1915 paper The Unconscious, he firmly rejects any
notion of a 'second conscious'. He detected that the most common response
to his observation that people have ideas, wishes, and beliefs, of which they
are not aware, has been to invoke the false assumption 'of another, second
consciousness which is unified in ones self with the consciousness one
knows" (191 5c; 146). That is, seeing the psyche as consisting of two kinds of
consciousness which are unitary and transparent in their activity. Such a
view would validate Sartre's assumptions about the nature of consciousness
in psychoanalysis. However, Freud points out that such an assumption is
invalid, if like himself, one holds that awareness is the defining feature of
the 'conscious'.
...a consciousness of which its own possessor knows nothing, is
something very different from a consciousness belonging to another
person, and it is questionable whether such consciousness, lacking
as it does, its most important characteristic, [awareness] deserves
any discussion at all (191 5c: 146).
It is, in fact, the equivalent of invoking an 'unconscious consciousness'
according to Freud and this simply could not account for the different latent
mental processes which he has described, which "enjoy a high degree of
independence, as though they had no connection with one another"
(19150:146).
Finally, Freud reminds us that his clinical investigation, which by
this time was well past its twentieth year, constantly showed him that latent
mental processes often had characteristics which were foreign and contrary
to those attributes of the conscious life with which we are familiar. Therefore,
what psychoanalysis proves, "is not the existence of a second consciousness
in us but the existence of psychical acts which lack consciousness'
(1915c:146).
Clearly, Freud's theoretical conception of the conscious /
unconscious division was one that was non-unitary and non-transparent.
Therefore, when one adds the clause that the belief which is not subject to
awareness is stored in the unconscious to the four other criteria for a case of
'self-deception' outlined by Sackeim and Gur (1977), one effectively
removes the basis of the logical paradox. As it has been shown that Freud
conceived of an unconscious which operated as an autonomous system to
the conscious, with it's own non-transparent contents, energy, and action,
there is no logical objection to the possibility that it could believe X while
the conscious held non-X and that the conscious would be unaware that the
unconscious held non-X. The autonomy of content in the two systems really
makes them parallel to a case of other-deception. As a result the criticism of
a 'logical paradox' only shows an inaccurate understanding of Freud's own
conceptualization about the nature of the conscious and the unconscious.
Given that Freud's notion of a nonunitary and nontransparent
consciousness is theoretically valid, we can now ask whether it is valid in
practice. The fact is that although Freud goes to great lengths to show that
there is a great divide between the conscious and unconscious systems
which renders them functionally autonomous, there are several instances in
his clinical accounts where this conclusion is betrayed by the patients'
behavior. As a result, there is a contradiction between theory and practice
when it come to Freud's nontransparent and nonunitary consciousness.
The 1915 paper Repression, provides a discussion of an instance of
the return of tfie repressed. Freud refers to the situation in which an idea that
was primally repressed, sends out derivatives, some of which,
have become sufficiently far removed from the repressed
representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by
reason of the number of intermediate links inserted, (that) they have
free access to the conscious (1915:149).
The 'free access' of repressed material to the conscious, only happens
because the ideational derivative is so far removed from the original idea
that it is quite unrecognizable. Freud goes on to say that during
psychoanalysis, a patient can produce a thread of these associated
derivatives until,
he is brought up against some thought, the relation of which to what
is repressed becomes so obvious that he is compelled to repeat his
attempt at repression" (1915:150).
In this account Freud seems to depart from his established notion of a non-
transparent consciousness. How can the derivative which is now conscious
have a relation to what is repressed (and therefore unconscious) which is 'so
obvious'? The contents of a primally repressed idea can never be 'obvious' to
the conscious.
Now, an immediate objection to this point could be that this is one of
a few isolated exceptions to Freud's commitment to a functional autonomy
between the content of the conscious and the unconscious. I would suggest
that on the contrary, this is in fact, the logical conclusion which the practice
of psychotherapy forces one to see. Here we have an instance where Freud
relates one of his metaphysical theories to the actual workings of
psychoanalytic technique with a patient. We see that at the logical base of
the therapy is the notion that resolution only comes when what has been
primally repressed finally becomes obvious to the conscious. The whole
point of psychoanalysis is to allow the therapist to collect the derivatives
and to slowly suggest associations to the patient. It was only by bringing "to
light the memory of the event by which [the symptom] was provoked and is
arousing its accompanying affect" (1983:SE 11 ;9) that the contents of the
repressed should become obvious. This occurs as the therapist suggests the
event based on the clues given in the associated derivatives. Thus, the
therapist is the link between the unconscious and the conscious. She alone
can see the relations of all these derivatives to what must be primally
repressed. Yet, it is entirely unclear how the conscious is ever going to be
able to recognize these threads and trace them back to what is rep'-^sed. For
the conscious, the content of the unconscious does not exist. It simply
should not be possible for it to "recognize" primally repressed content
because this has never been given access to the conscious. That the
conscious could suddenly become aware of the repressed contents of the
unconscious simply by recognizing the importance of an associated
derivative, is to suggest a transparent consciousness and this is in
contradiction to the claims Freud made about unconscious contents in many
other places.
I would tentatively suggest that it is here, at the level of the
pragmatic application of the theory that the incoherence of Freud's
theoretical commitment to a nontransparent consciousness is betrayed. The
conscious should never recognize primally repressed instincts, drives and
ideas, and yet in practice it clearly does so. Either the two systems are, in
fact, to some significant degree transparent even at the level of primary
processes, or the only other option is that the therapist is actually
reconstructing the association between the conscious threads and the
unconscious reality and the patient comes to accept these suggestions after
the latent link has been proposed. In the first case, the specific practices of
psychoanalytic therapy to uncover totally hidden truth is unnecessary. In the
second, one places a great deal of faith in the therapist to lead you down the
'right path'. Even if one ignores the incredible power of 'teacher expectancy
effects' which could be at work in this situation, one is left wondering how the
therapist can possibly make the right connections given the literally
countless options.
The conclusion is that in practice Freud is forced into a duality. It
has never been clear how the content of the unconscious can have causal
efficacy for the conscious and yet be completely unknown. Despite Freud's
explanation of ideational derivatives, the fact remains that there is supposed
to be a direct causal link between two agencies, one of which is never known
to the other. The fact that this causal link can be discovered by the patient in
psychoanalysis is direct evidence for the fact that the consciousness is at
least to some degree transparent. I suggest that it is impossible for any strict
account of a nontransparent and nonunitary consciousness to ever make real
sense of the observable data of conscious experience. Furthermore, such a
notion of consciousness has very important implications for Christian
beliefs. I shall return to a discussion of these implications in Chapter Six.
The Questionable Foundations' (Grunbaum's Critique)
Adolf Grunbaum (1984,1986) has seriously called into question the
empirical and philosophical foundations of some of the key casual
conjectures of psychoanalysis. For example, he takes the claim that
repression of conflict in childhood is a necessary cause of neurosis as an
example of a casual claim in psychoanalysis. Grunbaum then suggests that
to be an acceptable proposal, controlled evidence must be presented which
demonstrates that whether or not the effect occurs (neurosis), will depend on
whether or not the hypothesized cause occurs (repression of conflict).
Whilst this seems a reasonable and straightforward task, it has
proved elusive for psychoanalytic constructs such as repression. If for
example, one was to take the position that 'repression of conflict' always
occurs in childhood and this is the cause of neurosis, then all one actually
does is reduce the meaningfulness of the concept. It is the equivalent of
saying 'life is a necessary cause of neurosis' or 'being born is a necessary
cause of neurosis'. If then one supposes that only certain types of childhood
conflict cause neurosis, one must lay down specific criteria that differentiate
when the 'repression' would have causal efficacy and when it would not.
However, it precisely this kind of definite predictive claim which
psychoanalysis avoids. As a result, Grunbaum suggests that psychoanalysis
is not able to make comparisons between outcomes under different casual
conditions. Yet this is what is required to 'show' that repression of conflict is
a necessary cause of neurosis. In particular, this task eludes psychoanalysis
because of its reliance on the case study method, the very nature of which,
in the psychoanalytic situation prevents systematic controlled comparisons.
However, if one looks behind Grunbaum's empirically based
criticisms of methodology, such as the technique of free association, and the
bias inherent in clinical data, it becomes clear that what he is raising in his
objections to psychoanalysis is the much wider question of the nature of
science and the nature of evidence in science and it is at this level only that
Grunbaum's criticism will be answered. Its specific empincal claims are not
relevant to this thesis.
Grunbaum seems to assume that the truth and usefulness of a
theory can be determined only by reducing that theory to a set of
propositions that can be empirically verified in a controlled environment.
Scientific knowledge is empirically proven knowledge. Indeed, he seems to
hold what Chalmers (1990) would call a 'common sense' view of science in
which.
Personal opinion or preference and speculative imaginings have no
place... Science is objective. Scientific knowledge is reliable
knowledge because it is objectively proven knowledge (Chalmers
1990:1).
Although Grunbaum does not couch his criticism in the following
terms, what he seems to be pointing out is that just because it is possible to
derive logically valid premises and conclusions from Freud's writings does
not mean that the premises can be empirically verified. He presents the
following casual chain as an empirically testable hypothesis in Freud's
writings.
1. Neurosis is always caused by the repression of conflict in
childhood.
2. Fred repressed conflict as a child
3. Fred is neurotic.
This syllogism is logically valid, if the premises are true, the
conclusion follows. But the point is, deduction and logic alone tell us
nothing of the truth of the premises. Grunbaum argues that unless premise
(1.) is able to be proven then the whole syllogism establishes nothing. Surely
this is a truism which would be acknowledged by any scientist or
philosopher. However, it is the nature of what constitutes evidence or proof
that produces the basis of Grunbaum's argument. He rejects the notion that,
the collective success of psychoanalytic treatment is evidence for
the truth of the Freudian theory of personality... [or that] Freudian
analysis of the unconscious by means of free association is
validated as an investigative method by its therapeutic success
(Grunbaum 1986:223).
While he gives reasons such as the clinical data being artifacts of
the analyst's self-fulfilling expectations, really, the center of the criticism is
the validity of Freud's 'tally argument". This argument proposed that the
repeated observed success of psychoanalytic treatment can be taken as
evidence in support of the theories foundational causal claims. Freud was
clearly an inductivist, he gathered his 'evidence' from observing a particular
sequence of events producing a particular conclusion under a wide variety of
conditions (patient backgrounds), and when all those observed occurrences
led to the same result, he took this to be "evidence' and generalized the
conjectured casual chain to all people. What Grunbaum's critique comes
down to is a rejection of the inductivist approach to science. As a
falsificationist he suggests that theories cannot be established as true, or
even probably true in the light of observational evidence. He does not deny
that observation is always guided by and presupposes theory, but such theory
is only speculation or considered guessing about an observed behavior or
event. It cannot be considered an adequate explanation until it is rigorously
and ruthlessly tested by controlled observation and expehment. This is the
process of validating theories. To be scientifically acceptable a theory must
be able to be falsified, that is, there must exist a logically possible
observation statement or set of observation statements that if established
would falsify the claim.
The logic of falsificationism is grounded in the conviction that a
scientific law or theory "should ideally give us some information about how
the world does in fact behave, thereby ruling out ways in which it could
(logically) possibly behave but in fact does not" (Chalmers, 1990:41). It is at
this point that Freudian theory becomes very difficult to defend. Grunbaum
cites it as a classic example of speculative theory which cannot be validated
because it cannot be empirically falsified. I would want to modify
Grunbaum's claim to point out that in the first decade of Freud's work his
claims were, in fact, more readily testable and I think potentially falsifiable.
However, by the time the topography of the id, ego, and superego has been
developed, the theory as a whole has become unfalsifiable. For example, if a
man was walking past a burning building when suddenly he noticed a
beautiful young lady trapped at a high window he could either act on an id
impulse to dash into the building, despite the risk to himself and attempt to
save the damsel in hope of some serious gratitude on her part [the pleasure
principle]; or he could follow the ego's reasoning which would consider the
stupidity of running into a burning building where you could be burnt or killed
by falling materials with no assurance of reward and thus, chose to stand
back or leave [the reality principle]; or he could act upon his ethical
conscience, the superego which would point out his obligation to help the
girl, but in a realistic way, in this case he might ensure the fire department
has been called and wait for their arrival [the morality principle]. Thus,
whatever course of action the man takes, psychoanalysis can construct a
seemingly plausible 'explanation' of the behavior. In retrospect, one of these
elements of the personality would have too much psychic energy and thus
would dominate behavior. What then is the theory actually explaining? It
does not predict behavior based on definite claims about personality, it only
re-constructs a possible account after the event. A good scientific theory is
falsifiable only because it makes definite claims about the world a-priori and
these claims can then be tested. Freudian theory, particularly in its
topographic formulation resists any specific claims to predict behavior a-
priori and thus is never acceptable as scientific explanation of observed
behaviors.
Poorly Defined Terms.
Freud has often been criticized for poorly defined terms and for using
different terms interchangeably that were supposed to have different
meanings, as well as for changing the meanings of words over time. For
example, Madison (1957) claims that "the term 'repression' has at least four
distinct meanings, and these differences were just not worked out by Freud,
nor have they been by anyone else since" (1956:76). If this, in fact, is true
then it would cause some concern about the explanatory power of Freud's
theories, for one would constantly be unsure as to exactly what meaning
'repression' had at a given place and time in his writings.
If one surveys the use of the word 'repression' in Freud's writings, it is
true that at least four different emphases can be identified (Brenner, 1957;
Cohen & Kinston, 1983; Madison, 1956). Chapter one has already presented
an introductory survey of the development of these usage's with original
references. Here it will suffice to summarize the four ways Freud used the
term from 1893-1939.
1) Repression as 'motivated forgetting:
2) Repression as a term synonymous with the wider notion of
'defense'
3) Repression as the psychological function of rejecting and keeping
something from consciousness.
4) Repression as the inhibition of emotional experience (affect).
There is no question that the concept of repression changed and
developed over the half century of Freud's writing, and it is granted that this
may indeed cause some conceptual confusion for those coming to grips with
the concept and all its ramifications. But surely this is not a vice on Freud's
part. If people remain confused by the changes it is only because they are
unwilling to survey the development of Freud's thought in the primary
sources until they clearly understand them. Furthermore, it is not correct to
assume that Freud's later ideas on repression and the dynamic unconscious
were seen by him as the 'right ones' which supersede all others. As J.R.
Mazes (1983) points out on this subject; "people's final views are not
necessarily their best, and need not be taken as canceling all their earlier
ones, as if they were a last will and testament negating all previous versions"
(1984:144). Madison's claim that the differences in usage 'were just not
worked out by Freud' is absurd. There is no 'working out' to be done. The term
simply had different emphases at different times and places, and it depends
on what context you are referring to as to what emphasis is correct. It would,
in fact, be quite misleading to try to force one definition of repression on all
it's uses in Freud's writings.
This chapter has dealt with three of the most common theoretical
criticisms of Freud's theory, i.e., the alleged logical paradox, the inability to
produce scientific explanation of behavior, and the alleged conceptual
confusion's. Whilst I have tried to point out that elements of these criticisms
are perhaps not as problematic as they have been portrayed to be, it seems
clear that some significant objections have been established. In particular,
we have suggested that although the logical paradox may be able to be
explained away on theoretical grounds, it is not so easy to do so in practice.
Freud's theory seems compelled to come back to a transparent
consciousness in the pragmatic workings of psychotherapy. Furthermore, I
think that the discussion of the nature of scientific evidence or proof for a
theory must be taken into account by proponents of psychoanalysis. It is hard
to see any way in which Freud's topographical theory of personality can
produce specific claims about how a person will behave in a given condition.
Without a-priori suggestions of what is involved in a causal chain, it is not
possible to 'test' and thus potentially falsify the claim. The degree then to
which psychoanalysis can be said to truly explain behavior is highly
questionable.
Chapter Six
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CHAPTER SIX:
THE UNCONSCIOUSLY MOTIVATED
CHRISTIAN ?
"There is nothing worse than self-deception - when the deceiver is always at
home and always with you" (Plato, circa 386 B.C./1953).
"Jesus knew their thoughts and said to them, 'Every kingdom divided against
itselfwill he ruined, and every city or household divided against itselfwill not
stand'" (Mt. 12:25, NIV).
In this final chapter we shall make some preliminary and tentative
comments about the implications of the Freudian conception of the mind,
UMB's, and self-deception for classical Christian theism. I say 'preliminary'
because the implications are so vast and so varied that it is only possible to
give an introduction to the issues which need further study. I say 'tentative'
because this is only the beginning of my personal reflection on these issues
and as a result I do not claim to be able to fully substantiate any
conclusions. That is not my intent. The object is to raise concerns and issues
as I see them as a basis for further scholarly investigation.
As I see it, one of the great problems in this area is that so many of
the categories and assumptions of Freudian thought have found their way
into modern 'Christianized Psychology' with very few people really assessing
the philosophical and metaphysical presuppositions that must go along with
them if they are to remain coherent. I use the term 'Christianized psychology'
because this seems to be the end product of contemporary psychological
reflection engaged in by much of the Christian community. This raises the
issue of the nature of the 'Christian' and the 'Secular", and in particular the
question of what "Christian" knowledge is. This is a critical issue for the
Christian scholar to deal with, especially in the field of the humanities where
the distinction between 'Christian' and 'Secular' is often very unclear. As a
general rule I concur with the conclusion of Nicholas Wolterstorff in his
provocative essay Reason within the bounds of Religion (1976) that the
committed beliefs of the authentic Christian scholar will be determinative in
the formulation and assessment of theories and explanations. We ought not
be ashamed to be distinctively Christian in our world-view, for that is
fundamental to who we are. The Christian scholar does not automatically
conform to the 'scientific' conclusions of the age or the defensive reactions
of the church, but rather embarks on bold and imaginative research that is
guided by their authentic commitment to Christ in God's revelation resulting
in generally recognized truths.
In particularizing Wolterstorff argument to our discussion of
'Christian psychology' one is led to as the question 'What makes a
psychology 'Christian' ?'. And furthermore, what should be the Christians
response to secular psychological theory? A classic treatment of these
questions can be found in Carter and Narramore's The Integration of
Psychology and Theology (1976) in which they suggest that four possible
relationships exist. Firstly, the Christian can hold that the integration of
psychological theory and Christian belief is fundamentally inappropriate^
Secondly, one can assume that psychological theory and Chhstian belief
share a large arena of common concerns and that the exploration and
application of psychology to Christianity is fundamentally fruitful^.
Alternately, one could concede that there are, in fact, significant parallels
between Christian and psychological concepts but that these do not easily
translate from one to the other^. Finally, as the authors themselves conclude,
the Christian can hold that psychological theory and Christian belief are
thoroughly integrateable and that this is our task''.
My concern is that such a call for integration does not seem to
understand that at the base of secular psychological theory and Christian
For example see J. Adams, Competent to Counsel ( Grand Rapids: Baker, 1970), The Biblical view ofSelf-
Esteem, Self-Love, SelfImage (Eugene: Harvest House, 1986); W.K. Kirkpatrick, Psychological Seduction: The
failure ofModem Psychology (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1983); Hunt & McMahon, The Seduction of
Christianity (Eugene: Harvest House, 1985).
5 For examples see: S. Hiltner, Theological dynamics (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972); C. Jung, Psychology
and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); P. Meehl, What then is Man? (St Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1958); J. Sanford, Dreams: God's Forgotten Zawgw^zjf (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968).
^ For examples see: J.R.Fleck & J.D.Carter, Psychology and Christianity (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1981); C.
Narramore, The Psychology of Counseling (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, I960); M. Sail, Faith Psychology and
Christian Maturity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975).
7 For examples see: Carter & Narramore, The Integration of Psychology and Theology (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1979); L. Crabb, Effective Biblical counseling {GxmA^ Rapids: Zondervan, 1977); Gary Collins, The
rebuilding ofPsychology (Wheaton: Tyndale, 1077); Paul Tournier, Guilt and Grace (New York: Harper &
Row, 1962); K. Farnsworth, Whole-Hearted Integration (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985); also the now
out of print work by Frank Lake, Clinical Theology.
theism are fundamentally conflicting world-views which yield irreconcilable
conclusions. I think that it is possible to conclude that in many ways modern
Christian psychology has grown out of secular psychology. It could be argued
that a Christian understanding of the human being existed long before the
modern development of 'psychology' around the turn of the 19th century and,
therefore, secular psychology must have developed from it. In a sense this is
true, but the critical point is that the development of secular psychology was
based on the identification of tfie presuppositions of Christian belief and the
subsequent rejection of them. Men like Wundt and Freud and Skinner
identified the underlying metaphysic behind traditional Christian views of
man and rejected these as inconsistent with their own observations (Leahey,
1987). Furthermore, they rejected anything requiring a supernatural
explanation as absurd, for they were all scientific determinists. Their
resultant theories of human behavior are, therefore, 'secular' in the true
sense of the word, that is, they are naturalistic and deterministic.
The great problem with the trend of the last several decades for
Christian scholars and practitioners has been their tendency to take these
theories as a starting point, and ttien to marry them with Christian beliefs,
disregarding only that which cannot be made to fit. Very rarely has the
attempt been made to identify the metaphysical presuppositions that are an
integral part of these theories. Thus, we add Christian language and
categories to secular theories of human behavior and rarely see the
incongruence that exists at the most fundamental level - that of metaphysic
or worldview. It is my own conviction that a truly Christian psychology will
only occur if it grows out of excellent biblical exegesis and subsequent
theological reflection. Yet, this is a most rare phenomena in the world of
'Christian psychology'. I have yet to find a significant work on the nature of
the unconscious mind which uses scriptural exegesis as its starting point
rather than Freud, Herbart, Jung or some other secular scholar. The trend is to
let the work of Freud, for example, define the existence of the concept of a
dynamic unconscious and then to go to the biblical record to find "proof or
'disproof. In so doing the Bible becomes a commentary on the validity, or
otherwise, of a secular concept of human mental ontology which is assumed
to have validity a-priori.
The result is that Scripture is used to decide what can be retained
and what ought to be discarded. This, of course, has some validity, but it is
not the primary role of a Christian scholar. The primary question ought to be
'What is the nature of the human mind according to Scripture?', and
secondarily, 'Does Scripture suggest an understanding of human mental
functioning consistent with the notion of UMB's ?'. The fact that this is not
done, and that in its place secular theories are 'picked over' and the suitable
parts married to Christian concepts and categories has yielded a lot of what I
suggest should be seen as "Christianized psychology' rather than authentic
Christian psychology.
Now at this point the objection could be raised that the Bible is
characteristically silent on scientific issues. All of what we know about
cosmology and biology and the laws of physics has arisen from extra-biblical
conclusions based on innovative research. Of course this is true. I am not
suggesting that psychological theory stands against Christianity and that it
should be disregarded. Nor am I suggesting that Scripture is the only source
of truth with respect to human behavior. But I think that in the realm of human
psychology the revelation of God's dealings with humanity does reveal some
fundamental parameters for understanding behavior and thought. A thorough
exegesis of biblical views on 'mind', 'body', 'soul', 'spirit', 'flesh', 'sin', &
'knowledge', as they relate to human functioning would be a good starting
point for a biblical psychology.
With this general discussion in place, I shall now turn to the specific
task of considering a few implications of the notion of unconsciously
motivated behaviors for Christian theology. In particular, we shall ask
whether the notion of self-deception is congruent with classical theistic
beliefs. This is not a straightforward question. As we have seen the
coherence of the notion of self-deception relies on a specific view of
consciousness, that is, a conception of the mind as nonunitary and
nontransparent. It has been argued that this is the view of the mind which
Freud held to at a theoretical level. The logical consistency of his entire
system of psychoanalysis rests on the assumption that the mind is a
nonunitary entity comprised of conscious and nonconscious agencies in
which the content of each was completely nontransparent to the other.
What are the implications of this fundamental view of the mind for
the theories of Christianized psychology? The vast majority of Christianized
psychoanalysis assumes the validity of the dynamic unconscious and
resultant UMB's^. Yet they seem to manage this without ever realizing that to
do so requires the logical acceptance of a mind which is nonunitary and
^ For a few examples see: M. James & L. Savary, The Power at the Bottom ofthe W(f//(New York: Harper &
Row, 1974); J. Sanford, Dreams: God's Forgotten Language (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968); C. Jung,
Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press); J. & P. Sanford, The Transformation of the Inner
Man (Logos, 1982); Morton Kelsey, Christo-Psychology (Crossroads, 1982), The Christian and the
Supernatural {AMsh\xr%, 1976).
nontransparent. The critical issue then, is whether this notion of the mind is
compatible with a Biblical view of the human being as a free moral agent
who is fairly held accountable for her actions to a morally good God. It is
difficult to imagine how a morally good God could endow his creatures with a
nonunitary and nontransparent mind capable of true self-deception and still
hold them morally accountable. And yet, if this view of mind is rejected, the
logical foundation of the notion of unconsciously motivated behaviors falls
apart. This is the tension created when secular theories are christianized. In
order to understand more fully the issue, it will be beneficial to look more
closely at some of the implications of Freud's view of the mind for Christian
beliefs.
The issue off moral ffreedom:
Freud's entire theoretical system rests firmly on the assumptions of
biological determinism. All behavior is caused and at least to some degree
that causation is internal. Furthermore, all conscious behavior is causally
related to unconscious instincts, wishes, desires, and so on. Now, it is often
recognized that determinism and human moral freedom are incompatible,
but what of the specific case of the dynamic unconscious? Here also, there
seems to be no way to escape the ultimate conclusion of determinism if one
holds that the mind contains an unconscious system which has causally
efficacy for the conscious. Whenever conscious mental activity is explained
in terms of unconscious content, whether that be an instinct, a drive, a
traumatic memory, or a fantasy, then truly free moral choices become highly
dubious. If one behavior can be explained in terms of unconscious
motivation, then there is nothing to stop the logical conclusion that all
behavior, even the most "everyday' has some causal link to the realm of the
unconscious (as Freud himself concluded).
The notion of choice in such a system is absurd. One cannot chose
which unconscious content will be acted on and which will not because
consciousness (by definition) has no awareness of any unconscious content.
All human behavior ultimately becomes the result of internal drives and
instincts which are modified by the environment as it informs the ego's
reality principle. Now, most Christianized psychology will reject such
determinism as incompatible with theism and yet will retain the possibility of
UMB's. This is a blatant point of logical inconsistency. How can an agent be
morally free and yet be subject to the causal efficacy of an agency of which
she is, by definition, unaware?
The issue of responsibility:
The logical issue which arises from the discussion of determinism is
that of responsibility. Real moral freedom seems to be a pre-requisite to any
notion of morally accountability for one's actions. It is very difficult to see
how a morally good God could hold a being responsible for conscious
behavior which was unconsciously caused, even if this causation was only to
a small degree. There can be no moral responsibility required for the
instinctual workings of a dynamic unconscious whose content is not even
known to exist by conscious awareness.
Surely, when theism talks of a God who knows the 'thoughts and
intentions' of our heart and our "secret ways' (Ps 40:32; 90:7,8; Mt. 6:17,18), it
refers to thoughits and intentions which we ourselves know but keep hidden
from other people. This is required by the notion of a fair judgment. Although
this work does not pretend to be an exegetical study, it seems fair to point out
that the New Testament only refers to 'secret ways' in the context of hidden
thoughts and actions of which we are aware, but which we do not admit, or
actively speak against in the presence of others. That Paul could refer to the
fact that he and the Corinthians "have renounced secret and shameful ways"
(2Cor 4:2), implies a conscious decision of the will to cease hidden thoughts
and practices of which the Spirit of God had convicted them. Indeed, this is
the healing power of the gospel, to bring light to that which is hidden in
darkness and denial. However, it is not hidden in an unconscious mind where
it continues to cause our sinful behavior whilst we have no awareness of it.
The Spirit of God is nowhere in the NT portrayed as coming into a life to
clean up all of the unholy material in the unconscious mind. Quite to the
contrary, the Spirit convicts us of hidden sin which we actually know exists,
but which we never articulate or confess.
The biblical notion of Judgment makes this point very clear. Let us
consider a passage from Romans chapter 2:12-16.
All who sin apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, and all who sin
under the law will be judged by the law. For it is not those who hear the law that are
righteous in God's sight, but it is those who obey the law who will be declared
righteous. (Indeed when Gentiles who do not have the law, do by nature things
required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the
law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts,
their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now even
defending them.) This will take place on the day when God will judge men 's secrets
through Jesus Christ, as my gospel declares.
At least one of the things this passage seems to show is that humans will be
held morally accountable for all their thoughts and actions, even those
which are never articulated to another person. How can a morally good God
do this? Paul's answer is that the human mind (conscience) has been given a
basic understanding of the content of God's idea of moral decency.
Furthermore, the thoughts of the mind will either defend or accuse our
behavior in relation to this moral code.
Persons can be held morally accountable for every thought and
action by God precisely because they had the free will to rebel or conform to
God's standards. Far from a notion of a dynamic unconscious which is full of
primeval lusts and passion causing our sinful behavior, the NT seems to
indicate that each human mind has a built-in awareness of God's basic
moral requirements and that even secret rebellion is not excusable. The
reason it is not excusable is that we are 'aware' of it. It is not a matter of
unconscious motivation which makes a person sin. It is a matter of choosing
sin in the secret places of the heart when you know it is wrong. This is the job
of the Holy Spirit, to enter a willing life and to convict it of such thinking and
behavior for what it is - willful sin. What Freud would claim was the
unconscious motivation of the pleasure seeking id over which we have no
conscious control, God calls willful, though hidden sin. In most instances the
person is aware of the deepest, hidden places of their personality where
private lusts, perversion, and distortions live, always seeking to be overtly
fulfilled, thus, they are not truly unconscious at all. The beauty of conversion
is its work in exposing these elements of the personality for what they are and
giving us the option to choose against them with the help of God's grace.
But ifan unbeliever or some one who does not understand comes in while everybody
is prophesying, he will be convinced by all that he is a sinner and will be judged by
all, and the secrets ofhis heart will be laid bare. So he will fall down and worship
God, exclaiming, "God is really amongyou!" {XCov 14:24,25).
The conclusion of this look at NT theology is that it is simply
inappropriate to equate the 'inner man' or the 'secret ways' of people with the
unconscious mind. Modern Christianized psychology is far to prone to
commit this fallacy.
The issue of self-deception:
One of the purposes of this thesis has been to show that the notion
of UMB and subsequently the issue of self-deception, logically require a
view of the mind which is nonunitary (that is, it is comprised of functionally
autonomous agencies), and also nontransparent (that is, the content of the
unconscious is never known to the conscious). This is the only formulation of
consciousness in which self-deception and UMB can make logical sense.
And yet it is a conceptualization that even Freud could not adhere to in
practice as we have seen.
The conclusion I am forced to make is that there can be no place for
a notion of consciousness which claims to be nonunitary and nontransparent
in a Christian view of the human psyche. That is not to deny levels of
awareness, it is obvious that most mental content is not in awareness at a
given point of time. But that does not mean it is hidden in a dynamic
unconscious where it has causal efficacy. As a result the whole notion of
unconsciously motivated [and therefore causally determined] behavior must
also be rejected. It has been shown that a nontransparent and nonunitary
consciousness which is capable of self-deception seriously questions the
central theistic notion of humans as morally free and responsible agents.
Only a unitary and essentially transparent consciousness can fit the biblical
data when it speaks of the moral responsibility people have even for the
hidden places of their hearts.
The issue of inner healing:
Perhaps the most common area of discussion in popular
Christianized psychology is that of 'healing of the memories', or 'inner
healing', or 'healing the subconscious'. In closing I shall take a moment to
consider the implications of my conclusions for this body of ministry.
A clear distinction must be made between those whose wish to 'heal
the memories' and those whose wish to 'heal' or 'sanctify' the unconscious. It
should be realized that nowhere in this thesis has the notion of unconscious
mental content been questioned. This is a given in most schools of thought.
Obviously there is a huge amount of mental content which is not present in
conscious awareness at a given time. The question is whether this content
has causal efficacy. In the instance of a painful memory of a traumatic event
which may have happened a long time ago, there is often causal efficacy for
current behavior. For example, the memory of an instance of incest in
childhood may be contributing to current personality dysfunction (e.g..
avoiding all relationships with the opposite sex), but where is this memory?
Freud would say that it has been repressed to the point of complete
conscious oblivion, now existing only in the unconscious where it wrecks
havoc on the unsuspecting person. What then if this person engages in same
sex relationships - is this a point of moral accountability on their part? It
seems hard to see how it could be if their homosexuality is caused by a
traumatic memory of which they have no conscious awareness and thus can
do nothing about.
An alternative suggestion is that the memory is indeed stored in the
unconscious along with a lot of other material, but it is not completely
hidden from the conscious. The memory is known to exist, but due to its
painful nature it is ignored as much as possible. Yet at times it does come
back and cause intense guilt and anxiety. It is this associated guilt and
anxiety which caused current behavior to be dysfunctional. The Christian
approach is to have the patient own the memory, forgive the offending
parties, forgive themselves, and let the Spirit of God bring freedom from that
hidden memory. This may sound like psychoanalysis, but there is one major
difference: nowhere was the notion of a dynamic unconscious invoked to
explain the behavior. Instances where people actually have no awareness of
a traumatic event, or memory, or desire which is affecting their current
behavior is very rare and may, in fact, point to a specific pathology
(Narramore, 1984). The point is that a things "being unconscious' does not
mean that it is intentionally hidden from the conscious by some internal
dynamic, it simply means that it is not in conscious awareness at a given
point of time.
In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the incredible contribution of
Sigmund Freud to the psychological enterprise. His theory is vast and
detailed. We have dealt with aspect of that theory the unconscious
motivation of behavior. Yet, while I respect the theory, I am forced to
challenge its philosophical presuppositions. The view of the unconscious
mind as nonunitary and nontransparent opens the door for self-deception.
This in turn is incompatible with the theists view of humans as morally free
and morally responsible agents. It has been suggested that an appropriate
conception of consciousness for the Christian must begin with the qualities
of unity and transparency; the notion of a fair judgment seems to require this.
Finally it has been suggested that the practice of Christian psychotherapy
can continue with intellectual integrity without ever invoking the idea of a
dynamic unconscious and all of the logical problems it entails. Fully to
develop these implications is a task that is currently needed. To develop a
biblical theology of the mind is a task which is long overdue.
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